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 Executive Summary 
 
This Article explores how copyright law’s prohibition against unauthorized 
copying and sales may, counter to the law’s purported goal, have an overall negative 
impact on the production and dissemination of creative content. The Article contends that 
in the current lottery-like environment of many media markets, copyright law 
disproportionately inflates the revenues of the most popular creations, which leads 
publishers to spend increasing amounts on promotional campaigns, which, intentionally 
or not, drowns out economically marginal creations. This discourages, rather than 
encourages, investment in many new creations. Consequently, current copyright law may 
actually reduce the overall production of new creations. As an alternative to the current 
strict limits copyright law imposes on copying, this Article explains how new 
technologies, social norms, and much weaker prohibitions against unauthorized copying 
may be combined to create viable business models for financing new creations. These 
business models appear capable of ensuring creators and publishers a sufficient profit to 
stimulate creation and distribution but without the significant harms produced by broad 
prohibitions against unauthorized copying. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
[F]or the sake of the good, we must submit to the evil. 
-Thomas Macaulay,  
Speech Delivered in the House of Commons
1 
                                                                                                                         
 1.  See Thomas Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 
1841), in PROSE AND POETRY 731, 734-35 (para. 7) (G.M. Young ed., 1952). 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 787 
 
 
The granting of [exclusive copyrights by Congress], under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public 
that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly. 
-House Report on the 1909 Copyright Act
2 
The quotations above highlight a fundamental premise of copyright 
law: that granting the copyright holder a virtual monopoly by prohibiting 
the unauthorized copying and sales of copyrighted works
3 is a necessary 
evil for attracting the financial investments needed to promote the creation 
and distribution of these creative works. The rationale is that if creative 
works could be freely copied, unauthorized copies would drive prices be-
low the levels needed to induce most creators and publishers to invest in 
producing new works.
4 This would leave many valuable creative works 
uncreated or unpublished.
5 Thus, the assumption is that prohibiting unau-
thorized copying promotes a benefit—new creations—that outweighs the 
harm—limited access to these creations.
6 
                                                                                                                         
  2.  House Report on the 1909 Copyright Act, H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). 
 3.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 4.  1  PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.14, at 1:40-:41 (2d ed. Supp. 2004) (“To 
give fewer property rights than are needed to support this investment would give users 
freer access, but to a less than socially desirable number and quality of works.”). This 
market failure is intensified by content’s nature as a “public good,” the consumption of 
which by one person does not diminish the quantity available for another. See Harold 
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293 (1970); 
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 
387 (1954). Examples of public goods include non-rivalrous goods such as a song, a sun-
set, or national defense.  
  5.  At least it might not be offered as soon. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“It is evident that the monopoly granted by 
copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new material of 
potential historical value.”); id. at 557 (“Absent such protection, there would be little 
incentive to create or profit in financing such memoirs.”); MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-66.18 (1976); Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici 
Curiae at *4-*5, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (providing an 
economic analysis of the main feature of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 and 
stating that “[t]he main economic rationale for copyright is to supply a sufficient incen-
tive for creation”), available at www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?-
id=16; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989) (“Without copyright protection, authors, pub-
lishers, and copiers would have inefficient incentives with regard to the timing of various 
decisions.”). 
 6.  See RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOES? 
12 (2000); Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 335 (“Some copyright protection is neces-
sary to generate the incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works . . . .”). 
The benefits and costs of intellectual property are often measured via economic analyses. 
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Even those strongly opposed to monopolies accept the premise that the 
protection against copying provided by § 106 of the Copyright Act is re-
quired to stimulate investment in new creative works.
7 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 
characterized copyright law as “the engine of free expression.”
8 Although 
the Court’s opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft indicated doubt in the wisdom of 
Congress’s decision to extend copyright terms,
9 other court decisions on 
copyright have long presumed that Congress has crafted copyright legisla-
tion so as to maintain a “delicate balance” between excessive copyright 
protection (which limits consumption) and minimal copyright protection 
(which undercuts production).
10 Similarly, most copyright law commenta-
                                                                                                                         
See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 333-36 (describing a model of the effect of 
copyright protection on the creation of works). Against the background of the success of 
the first enclosure (of land) movement, the premise of almost all economic analyses of 
intellectual property law is that the recognition of strong property rights in intellectual 
creations is fundamentally sound. James Boyle calls this establishment of strong intellec-
tual property rights “the second enclosure movement.” See James Boyle, The Second 
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 33 (2003). 
  7.  Even many who criticize current copyright protection as excessive agree. See, 
e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 251 (2001) [hereinafter LESSIG, IDEAS] 
(supporting five year terms of protection, renewable fifteen times); JESSICA  LITMAN, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 80 (2001) 
(“[M]ore and stronger and longer copyright protection will always, at the margin, cause 
more authors to create more works.”); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on 
Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 938-39 (2002) (“Copyright, however, is generally jus-
tified precisely in terms of enhancing, not dampening, media entities’ capacity to perform 
their role. It supposedly leads to more and higher quality provision of information and 
vision.”); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 
192 (1934) (“More authors write books because copyright exists, and a greater variety of 
books is published.”). 
 8.  See 471 U.S. at 558; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stat-
ing that the purpose of copyright law is “to promote the creation and publication of free 
expression”) (emphasis original). 
 9.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208. 
 10.  See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“[I]t is not our role to alter the 
delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“Because this task involves a difficult balance be-
tween the interests of authors . . . in the control and exploitation of their writings . . . and 
society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the 
other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.”); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (“As with the development of other 
easy and accessible means of mechanical reproduction of documents, the invention and 
widespread availability of photocopying technology threatens to disrupt the delicate bal-
ances established by the Copyright Act.”). 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 789 
 
 
tors have also accepted that a significant general prohibition against copy-
ing is a necessary component of copyright law, and their research has fo-
cused on finding a socially optimal point along the continuum between too 
much and too little copyright protection.
11 
This Article challenges copyright’s fundamental premise by arguing 
that copyright law’s prohibition of unauthorized copying may not be nec-
essary or even actually helpful to inducing socially optimal levels of new 
creations from both creators and “publishers” in all media.
12 In fact, the 
Article contends that the prohibition against unauthorized copying may 
actually reduce the production of new works. This arises because of the 
development of new technologies and the emergence of many, if not most, 
                                                                                                                         
 11.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA]; OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 204 (1986) [hereinafter OTA Study]; WATT, supra note 
6, at 4; Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 326; see also Alan Greenspan, Market Econo-
mies and Rule of Law (Apr. 4, 2003) (“If our objective is to maximize economic growth, 
are we striking the right balance in our protection of intellectual property rights?”), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm. 
  12.  The term “publishers” is used hereinafter to include record companies, studios, 
and other disseminators of content. Although U.S. law vests copyright protection in au-
thors, not publishers, the economic rationale for copyright suggests that this choice was 
more tactical than substantive. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 927 (“[T]he mo-
nopoly privileges conferred by copyright protection and the potential financial rewards 
therefrom are not directly serving to motivate authors to write individual articles; rather 
they serve to motivate publishers to produce journals.”); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHUR-
RIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 8-9 (1967) (“[P]ublishers saw the tactical advantage of putting 
forward authors’ interests together with their own, and this tactic produced some effect 
on the tone of the statute”). In fact, support of the printers union was a key to passage of 
the 1909 Copyright Act. See SIVA VAIDHAYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: 
THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 55 (2001). 
Today, however, many artists would not mourn the loss of the major record companies. 
See Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2000, at 39, 50, 54-56 
(quoting Elton John as characterizing record companies as “thieves” and “blatant and out-
and-out crooks”); Neil Strauss, A Bill of Rights for Rockers Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
2002, at E3 (discussing the formation of the Recording Artists Coalition, which was 
formed to “take a stand on financial and creative issues pertaining to musicians, whose 
best interests sometimes conflict with the agenda of the Recording Industry Association 
of America”); Neil Strauss, David vs. Goliath to a Rock Beat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, 
at E3 (discussing lawsuits and settlements by artists); Janice Ian, The Internet Debacle—
An Alternative View, PERFORMING SONGWRITER MAG. (May 2002) (stating that argu-
ments that the recording industry and artists are being harmed by free downloading is 
“nonsense” and that “every time we make a few songs available on my website, sales of 
all the CDs go up”), http://www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html. 790  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
current media markets as lottery-like, “winner-take-all” markets, where 
promotional efforts may be more important than content. 
This Article charges that previous comprehensive economic analyses 
of copyright, with one exception,
13 are seriously flawed due to their failure 
to account for promotional expenses.
14 It observes that promotional costs 
often far outweigh the other costs associated with a creation, and asserts 
that analyzing the economics of copyright without considering them is like 
assessing a political election contest without considering campaign adver-
tising. 
Additionally, this Article explains that protection against unauthorized 
copying provides dramatically disproportionate benefits to the most popu-
lar creations: it enables the publishers seeking to create blockbusters to 
finance enormous promotional campaigns, which drown out valuable, ar-
tistic creations that lack competitive marketing efforts. In this way, § 106 
of the Copyright Act may actually serve to raise entry barriers for many 
new creations by diminishing expected profits for these economically 
marginal works. 
Instead of an overbroad protection against unauthorized copying, this 
Article explains how current technologies, social norms, and minimal pro-
tection against copying could be used to support many profitable business 
models for creators and publishers. In fact, because current copyright pro-
tection likely reduces the overall number and breadth of new creations 
produced, these new models may encourage the production of even more 
creations. This approach builds on the findings of then-Professor Stephen 
Breyer’s 1970 article, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, which revealed that 
the economic case for copyright protection was tenuous in many segments 
of the publishing market.
15 Breyer used empirical data,
16 which supported 
                                                                                                                         
  13.  One exception is Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copy-
right: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 
316-17 (2002) (recognizing the need to finance marketing and promotion). 
  14.  In their classic 1989 economic analysis of copyright, Landes and Posner ignore 
other fixed costs of producing an original and do not consider marginal marketing costs. 
Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 327, 333. Nor do they address this omission in their 
recent book discussing the economic configuration of intellectual property law where a 
slightly revised version of their 1989 article appears as chapter 3. WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71-
84 (2003). In his detailed and otherwise comprehensive book, COPYRIGHT AND ECO-
NOMIC THEORY, Watt also points out that his equations are “an abstraction from any real 
life situations.” WATT, supra note 6, at 201-02. 
 15.  Stephen  Breyer,  The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyrights in 




17 to demonstrate that there were viable business 
models that worked in some segments of print publishing even in the ab-
sence of copyright protection. In addition, this Article greatly expands 
upon the scope of Raymond Ku’s article, The Creative Destruction of 
Copyright, which examined online distribution of music and argued that 
copyright is unnecessary for digital works.
18 
This Article further challenges the necessity of a law prohibiting unau-
thorized copying by noting its lack of empirical support. For example, the 
fashion and food industries, among others, manage to stimulate new crea-
tions with reliance only upon trademark law protections and social 
norms.
19 Meanwhile, experts have concluded that the net effect of current 
copyright laws on creative output is ambiguous.
20 In fact, neither Congress 
                                                                                                                         
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See, e.g., Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of 
Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); Plant, supra note 7. 
 18.  Ku,  supra 13, at 267-68. 
 19.  See L ITMAN, supra note 7, at 105-06; Malla Pollack, A Rose is a Rose is a 
Rose—But is a Costume a Dress?, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1 (1993); Malla Pollack, 
Note,  Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, of How to Copyright a 
Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 (1991). Other types of intellectual 
content lacking specific legal protection in the United States include jokes, perfumes, and 
furniture. See Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in 
COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 9 
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A 
Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 287 (1989). 
Trademark law generally provides sufficient protection. See 15 U.S.C. §§  1051-1127 
(2000). 
 20.  See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 41 Box 1.4 (“No [solid] body of work 
exists with respect to the importance of copyright in fostering information creation and 
use.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 343 (1988) (recognizing that data to 
test the economic argument for copyright “has never been gathered”); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 5, at 354 (recognizing that “it is not certain that any copyright protection is 
necessary to enable authors and publishers to cover their fixed costs”); Kai-Lung Hui & 
I.P.L. Png, On the Supply of Creative Work: Evidence From the Movies, 92 AM. ECON. 
REV. 217 (2002) (not finding sufficient evidence to show that the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Act led to an increase in U.S. movie production); Randall C. Picker, Copyright as Entry 
Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 453 (2002) (observ-
ing that analyses of copyright law generally avoid the central social welfare question of 
whether creative works would be created in the absence of particular provisions of copy-
right law). Moreover, there is substantial evidence against the need for copyright. See, 
e.g., Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture 
of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 92-96 (1999) (arguing that the current copyright regime 
lacks a rational basis and was instituted based upon misleading empirical evidence and 
despite the lack of evidence of market failure absent copyright protection). But see Bell, 
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nor the industry lobbyists who have shepherded the Copyright Act through 
its frequent expansions have offered convincing evidence that § 106 pro-
vides a net benefit to society or is less burdensome than alternatives.
21 
Rather, the industry’s response to Breyer’s 1970 wake up call appears to 
have been a combination of denial and of relief that he stopped short of 
advocating that copyright be abolished.22 In any case, Congress has neither 
                                                                                                                         
supra note 19, at 7-8; Jessica D. Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965-
67, 998 (1990) (“Most arguments over the appropriate scope of copyright protection, 
unfortunately, occur in a realm in which empirical data is not only unavailable, but is also 
literally uncollectible.”). 
    Even with respect to patents, in 1958, Machlup concluded that, “None of the 
empirical evidence at our disposal and none of the theoretical arguments presented either 
confirms or confutes the belief that the patent system has promoted the progress of the 
technical arts and the productivity of the economy.” FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., at 79 (1958) [here-
inafter MACHLUP REPORT]. For more recent data on this point see F.M. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 450-54 (3d ed. 1990); RUTH 
TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE AND REWARD 21 (2002); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and 
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986); Roberto Mazzoleni & Rich-
ard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 1031 (1998). 
 21.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206, 207 n.15 (2003) (referencing only the 
self-serving testimony of some artists); Breyer, supra note 15, at 351 (“The [congres-
sional hearings on the Copyright Revision Bill] reveal little critical analysis of industry 
claims that protection is needed.”); Pollack, supra note 20, at 92 (“The Copyright Office 
finessed the absence of any evidence of market failure by declaring that Congress has 
often acted to legislate market conduct without empirical evidence.”). Copyright law ap-
pears to pay little attention to the interests of consumers. Rather, it appears that Congress 
has agreed to defer judgment to industry representatives when they can develop a consen-
sus among themselves on copyright legislation. See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to 
Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1684-86 (1999) (characterizing copyright legislation as a “se-
ries of contract negotiations” between interest groups without any “independent congres-
sional evaluation of the substance of the negotiated agreements”); Jessica D. Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL  L.  REV. 857, 870-80 
(1987); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. 
REV. 275, 314-15 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright Legislation]; Thomas P. Olson, 
The Iron Law of Consensus: Congressional Responses to Proposed Copyright Reforms 
Since the 1909 Act, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 109, 120 (1989); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copy-
right for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1243 (1998).  
  22.  According to Paul Goldstein, Breyer’s article questioning the need for copyright 
was the main topic of conversation of copyright lawyers for months after it was pub-
lished. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 24 (1995). Nevertheless, the only scholarly response to Breyer’s article was a 
student piece by Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection 
for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971), which 
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assessed the business models discussed below nor examined how the ex-
plosion of marketing has changed the content market. 
Part II gives some background on current copyright laws before dis-
cussing how the explosion of marketing and copyright’s role in financing 
such marketing appears to increase entry barriers to creation and how 
other effects of § 106 also deter new creation. Part III identifies the costs 
creators and publishers must cover to induce them to publish. Part IV de-
scribes many business methods based on distribution technologies, social 
norms, and government funding, which together could provide viable 
business models that include only a very limited prohibition against copy-
ing. Part V offers a proposal for a severely truncated prohibition against 
unauthorized copying. Finally, Part VI offers a short conclusion. 
II.  THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION UNDER § 106 
The Exclusive Rights Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.”
23 Based on this clause, Congress 
granted copyright owners the exclusive rights outlined in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106.
24 Most significantly, § 106 includes the rights: “(1) to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phon-
                                                                                                                         
Breyer easily answered in Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 
(1972). Goldstein interprets Breyer’s response to be backpedaling from the position that 
copyright was unjustified, GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 25-26, but Breyer’s explanation for why 
he had declined to urge that copyright be eliminated merely reiterated his previous state-
ments. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 321-23. But see William W. Fisher III, Reconstruct-
ing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1708 n.231 (1988) (finding Tyer-
man’s response convincing). 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This Article uses “Exclusive Rights Clause” in 
place of “Intellectual Property Clause” or “Copyright Clause” because this appears to be 
a more accurate description of the clause.” See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking 
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 173, 175 n.10 (2003). 
 24.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (stating that “the owner of copyright under this title 
has the exclusive rights . . .”); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 
U.S.C.); The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 794  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
orecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending . . . .”
25 
Section A reviews the justification for a prohibition against unauthor-
ized copying. Section B, however, explains how the protection under 
§ 106 appears to be having some unanticipated effects. It observes that, by 
enabling publishers in many current lottery-like content markets to dra-
matically increase their revenues from their most popular works and then 
to spend them on promoting those works, § 106 leads those popular works 
to crowd out more economically marginal works, thereby, having a net 
negative effect on new creations. Section C discusses other effects of 
§ 106 that frustrate vibrant new creation. 
A.  The Justification Behind the § 106 Prohibition of Unauthorized 
Copying  
Throughout the world, intellectual property rights have been justified 
under at least three theories. Under a “natural rights” theory, copyright 
protection merely codifies a creator’s natural right to possess the fruits of 
his or her labor.
26 Under a “just reward” theory, copyright protection rec-
ognizes that justice dictates that creators deserve the benefits of what they 
have created.
27 Under a “public welfare” theory, however, copyright pro-
tection is granted solely as a necessity to promote the creation and distri-
                                                                                                                         
  25.  17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 26.  Breyer,  supra note 15, at 284-85; Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 17, at 422. 
This rationale, generally associated with the French, recognized a natural, almost divine 
right to one’s creations. In the words of one philosopher, “[I]t’s mine because I made it 
. . . . It wouldn’t have existed but for me.” See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intel-
lectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 36 (1989). These rationales, however, have 
serious weaknesses. See, e.g., Hurt and Schuchman, supra note 17, at 243 (finding that 
the main difficulty with natural property right theory is applying the principle upon which 
it is based more generally); see Weinreb, supra note 21, at 1217-29 (“Traced to ground, 
the argument that an author has a ‘natural’ property in the copyright of his creation de-
pends on a string of distinct but related propositions that are independently plausible and 
gain added force by their relation, but are in fact vulnerable.”). 
  27.  This theory, supported by classical English economists like Adam Smith and 
John Stuart Mill, viewed ones right to ownership of the fruits of ones work as a just re-
ward for the creation. MACHLUP REPORT, supra note 20, at 21. However, the “just re-
ward” rationale is not without weaknesses. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 285-91 (listing 
some weaknesses such as “discerning the extent to which an author should be able to 
maintain control” of the creation and determining the “value” of the work to society); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1248 
(1996) (arguing that the just reward rationale “rests on a faulty foundation” because “[i]n 
a market economy, the principal importance of high compensation is as a signal designed 
to affect future behavior, not as a reward for past achievement”). 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 795 
 
 
bution of new creative works, a result that would be in the public’s best 
interest.
28  
Before the U.S. Constitution was adopted, laws granting copyright 
protection in the United States were justified under multiple theories.
29 
However, the Exclusive Rights Clause of the Constitution uses only a pub-
lic welfare justification and does not mention a natural rights justification 
for protection. As the House Report on the 1909 Copyright Act declared: 
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the 
terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that 
the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the 
welfare of the public will be served . . . . Not primarily for the 
benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, 
such rights are given. . . .  
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider .  .  .  two 
questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the pro-
ducer and so benefit the public; and, second, how much will the 
monopoly granted be detrimental to the public.
30 
The public benefit rationale for copyright law was underscored by 
Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, long-time chair of the House subcom-
mittee with jurisdiction over copyright and one of the primary players re-
sponsible for the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act: 
[T]he primary objective of the intellectual property laws is not to 
reward the author or inventor, but rather to secure for the public 
the benefits derived from the labors of authors and inven-
                                                                                                                         
  28.  Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 422, 441 (1985). 
 29.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolu-
tionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1000-02 (1990); Sterk, supra note 27, 
at 1199.  
 30.  H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
246-47 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution itself describes the basic Clause 
objective as one of ‘promoting the Progress of Science,’ i.e., knowledge and learning. 
The Clause exists not to ‘provide a special private benefit,’ . . . but ‘to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.’”) (citations omitted); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 
(8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) (“That Congress, in passing the Act of 1790, did not legislate in 
reference to existing rights, appears clear . . . Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanc-
tioning an existing right . . . created it.”); H.R. REP. 100-609, at 17 (1988). The writings 
of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Macaulay, Adam Smith, and James Madison also indicate 
a great concern about the problems with granting creators’ monopoly rights. See Eldred, 
537 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J., dissenting); VAIDHAYANATHAN, supra note 12, at 22-24; 
Benkler, supra note 23, at 180-97; Boyle, supra note 6, at 53-56. 796  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
tors. . . . The argument that a particular interest group will make 
more money and therefore be more creative does not satisfy 
.  .  .  the constitutional requirement of the intellectual property 
clause.
31 
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the Exclusive Rights Clause in 
this manner. In Mazer v. Stein, the Court noted that “[t]he economic phi-
losophy behind the clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of in-
dividual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare.”
32 Furthermore, consistent with the 1909 House report, the Court has 
interpreted the Constitution to limit Congress’s ability to grant copyright 
monopolies. In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court held 
that copyright’s monopoly privileges “are neither unlimited nor primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a 
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is in-
tended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward.”
33 The Court has also explicitly stated that 
monopolies are not permitted under the Exclusive Rights Clause when 
there is no “concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”
34 
                                                                                                                         
  31.  Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 28, at 422, 441; see also Ralph S. Brown, 
Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. 
REV. 579, 591-92 (1985); Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright 
Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium, 59 U. PITT.  L.  REV. 719, 723 (1998) 
(“[C]opyright rights should be protected, unless it can be shown that the extent of protec-
tion is hampering creativity or the wide dissemination of works.”). 
  32.  347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); accord Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975) (“The ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the gen-
eral public good.”); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at § 1.14, at 1:40. While the Court in 
Mazer observed that ensuring that creative artists receive “rewards commensurate with 
the services rendered” is a goal of copyright law, 347 U.S. at 219, the Court has else-
where noted that “copyright law, like the patents statute, makes reward to the owner a 
secondary consideration.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).  
  33.  464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211-13. The Court 
quoted Sony in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often rec-
ognized the monopoly privilege that Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to moti-
vate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ 
are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public good.”).  
  34.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (em-
phasis added); see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest 
of the United States and the primary objective in conferring the monopoly lie in the gen-
eral benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”). But the Court in Eldred 
accorded great deference to Congress on this matter. See 537 U.S. at 207 n.15, 212-13 
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Thus, the Supreme Court and Congress have often recognized that the 
Exclusive Rights Clause of the Constitution limits Congress’s authority to 
grant copyrights and that copyright law must further the interests of the 
public, not merely the creators or publishers.
35  
B.  How the Marketing Explosion Leads § 106 to Crowd Out 
Marginal New Creations 
In furthering the public interest, Congress, courts, and scholars have 
long supported a substantial prohibition against unauthorized copying.
36 
Today, however, promotional expenses, a variable that almost everyone 
has ignored when examining the economic incentives and justifications for 
copyright law,
37 have exploded. This has dramatically changed the eco-
nomic environment of many media markets and should provoke policy-
makers to reexamine whether and when prohibiting copying actually best 
serves the public good.
38  
In many media markets today, marketing may be the most significant 
cost. That may not appear to be the case for major feature films, for which 
2002 figures indicate average costs of $58.8 million to produce and $27.3 
million to market,
39 but those figures hide a significant marketing cost in 
production costs. While actors’ salaries are treated as a production cost, 
the fees commanded by superstar actors seem to reflect their marketing 
value rather than their acting skills.
40 Meanwhile, major music labels 
                                                                                                                         
(“We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to de-
cide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”) 
 35.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) 
(“[This]  limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be 
achieved.”) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) 
(emphasis added); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); Yochai Benkler, 
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Crea-
tion and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539-
52 (2000); Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the 
Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 56-64 (2000). 
 36.  See supra notes 2, 3, 6. 
 37.  See supra notes 13, 14. 
  38.  For example, increased distribution enables more people to consume a work and 
more creators to build on the work to produce derivative works. See Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945) (stating 
we are all standing “on the shoulders of giants”). 
 39.  See M OTION  PICTURE  ASS’N  WORLDWIDE  MARKET  RESEARCH,  U.S.  ENTER-
TAINMENT INDUSTRY: 2002 MPA MARKET STATISTICS 19, 20 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 
MPA STATS]. “Negative costs” includes production costs, studio overhead, and capital-
ized interest. Id. at 19. Marketing costs are costs incurred after production. Id. at 20. 
  40.  Realistically a large portion of the fee for marquee actors like Tom Cruise and 
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spend hundreds of thousands, on average, on promotion for a new album 
(including payola),
41 as compared to only $80,000 to $150,000 for produc-
ing them.
42 Michael Jackson even complained when Sony spent only about 
$25 million to market his album “Invincible.”
43 The book publishing in-
dustry has also seen the triumph of marketing.
44  
Furthermore, the promotion of creative works is not simply to inform 
the public about the works; it is also to create “solidarity goods,” which 
are products valued, in large part, due to their popularity, separate and 
                                                                                                                         
Julia Roberts should be recognized as a marketing, not a production, cost. See A.O. Scott, 
We’re Ready for Their Close-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, §5 at 5 (movie stars are 
defined by their “ability to generate box-office cash”). But see Arthur de Vany & David 
Walls, Uncertainty in the Movies: Does Star Power Reduce the Terror of the Box Office?, 
23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 285, 302-03 (1999) (finding that stars appear to have an impact 
on the number of screens films open on and remain on, but not necessarily on revenues). 
After this adjustment, marketing costs in the film industry may actually exceed first copy 
costs. See RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ARTS AND 
COMMERCE 76-78, 109-10 (2000) (“Superstar salaries thus consist largely of rents. With 
producers competing to employ [the superstar], the star’s pay tends to be the expected 
rent that she can attract.”). 
 41.  See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS 163 (5th ed. 
2001) (estimating marketing costs at up to $100,000 for a standard release and $500,000 
for a major artist); Douglas Abell, Pay for Play: An Old Tactic in a New Environment, 2 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 52 (2000) (discussing payola); Lynn Hirschberg, Who’s That 
Girl?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, § 6 at 30 (stating that the fee for promoters can range 
from $100,000 to $400,000); Moses Avalon Royalty Calculator, MosesAvalon.com, at 
http://www.mosesavalon.com/marc.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2004) (providing a royalty 
calculator for creators and setting $500,000 as the default amount for average promo-
tional expenses on a major label deal); see also Tobias Regner, Innovation of Music, in 
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 104, 107-09 
(Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003). 
  42.  Typically, musical recording costs for relatively new artists’ albums by major 
studios range from $80,000 to $150,000. M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, 
THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 23 (8th ed. 2000). There is also the $3 to $5 per CD mark-up by 
retailers to cover their costs, including marketing costs. See  Jon Healey, CD Sticker 
Shock Accounting for Retail Sale Prices That Drive Song-Swapping Sites, SAN  JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2000, at 1D. 
 43.  See Laura M. Holson, A Pop Star Wants a Promotion Budget Fit for a Jackson, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at C1. 
 44.  See GAYLE FELDMAN, BEST AND WORST OF TIMES: THE CHANGING BUSINESS OF 
TRADE BOOKS, 1975-2002, at 16-22 (2003) (finding that in the 1970s the focus in pub-
lishing shifted from editorial to marketing); Ken Auletta, The Impossible Business, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 6, 1997, at 50, 63; Bill Goldstein, Honing the Science of the Release Date, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at C9 (“The ‘opening’ of a major book has increasingly come 
to resemble the opening of a movie.”). 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 799 
 
 
apart from their intrinsic quality.
45 Publishers hope consumers will feel 
pressure to purchase these popular creative products to allow them to join 
conversations with friends about the movie plotline, television character, 
or book,
46 and to belong to the group of consumers that has enjoyed the 
popular creative work.
47 This pack mentality contributes to the current 
winner-take-all content environment—a highly skewed market with a few 
big winners and a lot of losers.
48 
The incredibly cluttered nature of the current media markets only 
heightens the lottery environment. Today publishers annually release 
about 450 new major feature films,
49 20,000 new music albums,
50 and 
more than 100,000 new books.
51 In addition, other producers of original 
content include most of the nearly 350 national television networks,
52 
many of the 13,000 radio stations,
53 and 10,000 more specialized maga-
zines and other periodicals.
54 The Internet offers millions of pages of blogs 
                                                                                                                         
 45.  See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity Goods, 9 J. POL. 
PHIL.129, 132 (2001). 
 46.  See C AVES, supra note 40, at 180-82 (describing the benefits creative goods 
receive from social interchange because “people like to converse about creative goods” 
and “[c]reative goods and the cultural consumption capital that surrounds them provide 
what is likely the most suitable grist [for conversation]”); Robert H. Frank, When Less is 
Not More, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2000, at A19. 
  47.  Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 45, at 132. 
 48.  See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: 
WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET  SO  MUCH MORE  THAN THE REST OF US 19 (1995) 
(“[W]inner-take-all markets attract too many contestants, result in inefficient patterns of 
consumption and investment, and often degrade our culture.”); Glenn M. MacDonald, 
The Economics of Rising Stars, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 155 (1988); Sherwin Rosen, The 
Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 (1981); Verlyn Klinkenborg, Nothing 
But Troubling News From the World of Publishing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A24 
(“Like the film and music industries, publishing is now driven wholly by the search for 
blockbuster books.”). 
 49.  See 2002 MPA STATS, supra note 39, at 14. 
 50.  See Jon Pareles, Best of the Obscure Among 2001’s Albums, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 
2002, at E1. 
  51.  The number of new book titles rose from 46,743 in 1990 to 122,108 in 2000. See 
FELDMAN, supra note 44, at 8-9. 
 52.  See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery 
of Video Programming, Tenth Annual Report ¶ 142 & tbl. 8 (2004), http://hraunfoss.-
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-5A1.pdf (last visited May 9, 2004).  
 53.  See Audio Services Division, Fed. Communications Comm’n, Broadcast Station 
Totals (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/totals (last visited May 
9, 2004). 
  54.  In addition, there are more than 11,000 magazines of quarterly or greater fre-
quency and as many as 18,000 magazines. See B ENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS 
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and other new content. Meanwhile, this new content competes with all the 
creative works produced in previous years.
55  
Under these conditions, publishers seeking to field one of the few win-
ners in each niche market will often feel compelled to match their com-
petitors’ marketing efforts.
56 These promotional efforts are highly com-
petitive, with winning often more dependent on the quality of the market-
ing than the quality of the product.
57 With success in these markets—the 
potential profits from being a solidarity good or other blockbuster—
resembling a rent, these promotional campaigns represent a form of “rent 
seeking.”
58 Also, much of the marketing expenses seeking to shift demand 
among equally valuable allocations appear to be socially wasteful.
59 The 
                                                                                                                         
GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?: COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS 
MEDIA INDUSTRY 156-57 (3d ed. 2000). 
  55.  In 1997, there were 1.3 million books in print. See id. at 61. In 2000, more than 
18,000 feature films were stored in studio vaults. See VOGEL, supra note 41, at 65. More-
over, the Internet has spawned a substantial increase in the exchange of used media con-
tent. See Richard Rayner, An Actual Internet Success Story, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, 
§ 6 at 112.  
 56.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 109, 393 n.25; Ann Beattie, Essentials Get Lost in 
the Shuffle of Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at E1 (“Writers are afraid not to be 
[on book tours], for fear they’ll be completely lost in the shuffle, but paradoxically, by 
getting out there we add to the problem.”). 
 57.  See David D. Kirkpatrick, Bookselling, the Unlikely Spectacle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2002, at C6 (“It is a difficult trick making any book stand out at the booksellers con-
vention—a noisy literary circus where scores of publishers and hundreds of authors des-
perately compete for attention.”); Eric A. Taub, You Oughta Be in Print, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 2002, at G1 (stating the key to success for those offering online books is getting 
noticed); Bernard Weinraub, A Warbler Set Aloft by a Dedicated Flock; Patience Pays 
Off for Nelly Furtado’s Team, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at E1. 
 58.  See generally PAUL PECORINO, RENT SEEKING: A TEXTBOOK EXAMPLE 8-9 (U. 
Ala. Econ. Fin. & Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 04-01-01, 2004), http://www.ssrn.-
com/abstract=496062 (last visited May 9, 2004); Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 315, 316 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. 
J. 224 (1967). 
  59.  Expenditures made to hype or simply to neutralize competitors’ spending appear 
to be socially inefficient. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Clinton Acts and Tobacco Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at F1 (stating that the government’s ban on tobacco company ad-
vertising on television appears to have increased industry profits by eliminating substan-
tial “defensive” advertising). This type of promotion is in contrast to the type that helps 
buyers find better matches for their idiosyncratic tastes, like that aiding “selection assis-
tant” (SA) services, see infra Part IV.A.4, or which adds “psychic” value to creative 
works, the way cosmetics marketing often does. See Ruth La Ferla, Front Row, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at B9 (“‘She’s not buying that tube [of lipstick] for the color; she’s 
buying it for the story.’”) (quoting Mary Lisa Gavenas, a former beauty editor at Glam-
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marketing expenditures of competitors also become a major factor in de-
termining which projects will be profitable, creating a promotional “arms 
race.”
60 As one commentator observed, “the costs of marketing new re-
leases to a mass audience have grown prohibitive . . . [and] those costs 
have long helped limit competition from smaller companies.”
61 As a re-
sult, high quality content, especially from smaller producers without deep 
pockets, can be drowned out.
62  
The overbroad copyright protection of § 106 feeds this beast by allow-
ing the most popular creations to earn revenues well beyond what publish-
ers need to cover the production and distribution costs of their new crea-
tions: successes and failures. Publishers then feel compelled to turn around 
and dissipate these revenues on larger marketing campaigns or greater 
rents for the few most popular creators.
63 In fact, this type of rent seeking 
may well dissipate 100% or more of the increased revenues generated by 
§ 106.
64 The higher marketing expenses financed by § 106 raise entry bar-
riers, leaving many economically borderline projects unprofitable. Thus, 
                                                                                                                         
our and Mirabella). 
 60.  See supra note 57; cf. Merges & Reynolds, supra note 35, at 55. Moreover, as in 
politics, the “horse race” aspect of the process has become a story that may eclipse the 
substance of the content. See, e.g., Rick Lyman, A Strong Start for ‘Catch Me’ but ‘Two 
Towers’ is Still Tops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at E1.  
 61.  Jon  Pareles,  Spit Out by the Star-Making Machinery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, 
§2 at 28. 
 62.  See VOGEL, supra note 41, at 90-91 (stating that films of high merit may be 
“pulled” if they are not quick hits); Goldstein, supra note 44 (“[T]he definition of big has 
changed in publishing, as it has in other entertainment industries. . . . [¶] ‘It’s more im-
portant than ever to have a fireworks display,’ said Patricia Eisemann, publicity director 
of Scribner, a division of Simon & Schuster.”); Healey, supra note 42; Ian, supra note 12 
(describing this phenomenon in the music industry); Pareles, supra note 50. But see Mar-
tin Arnold, Room at the Table for Fresh Faces, Dec. 19, 2002, at E3. 
 63.  See Ku, supra note 13, at 316-17 (contending that copyright cannot be justified 
based on its ability to help publishers finance marketing efforts that distort consumer 
choice); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private 
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 876 (2001). 
  64.  There is a tendency for rent seeking expenditures to exceed the total reward in 
lottery environments. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: Analysis 
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Lunney, supra note 63, at 879 
n.210 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumu-
lative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992)); D. Michael 
Risinger et al., Brave New “Post-Daubert” World—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 
SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 425 (1998). But see Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redun-
dancy 11 (2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=374580 (last visited May 9, 
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§ 106 seems likely to make it harder for marginal new works to find pub-
lishers willing to publish and promote them.  
Meanwhile, the economic argument that § 106 necessarily promotes 
more creative works at the margin is flawed. The argument is that copy-
right protection allows publishers to appropriate a greater portion of the 
economic value generated by the few economically borderline new works 
that become blockbusters.
65 They do so by protecting such works against 
the competition blockbusters would face, and the accompanying reduced 
prices and revenues. Such protection should thereby lead publishers to 
find more of those works profitable and thus publish them.
66 Copyright 
supporters would argue that this demonstrates how § 106 pushes economi-
cally borderline creative works into profitability and increase the number 
of new works.
67 
The hidden and misleading assumption in this reasoning is that be-
cause § 106 produces this initial increase in the expected revenues of bor-
derline creative works, the provision has a net positive effect on the profit-
ability of such works. Yet this incomplete analysis assumes that all other 
factors relevant to the new works’ revenues and profitability remain con-
stant, and they do not. Rather § 106 also leads the revenues from the most 
popular works to increase, and disproportionately more than the revenues 
of more borderline works.
68 This allows publishers of the most popular 
works to disproportionately increase their marketing efforts, forcing pub-
lishers of marginal works to either 1) spend even more money on market-
ing simply to retain their sales and revenues or 2) refrain from further in-
creasing marketing expenditures, but see their works’ sales and revenues 
decline. In either case, the increased marketing costs or decreased reve-
nues triggered by § 106 likely lead many otherwise marginally profitable 
                                                                                                                         
 65.  See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 20 (Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Some 
scholars argue that diminishing current copyright rewards would diminish publishers’ 
willingness to take risks, i.e., publish untried or risky work. See Paul Goldstein, Copy-
right, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 83 (1992); David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept 
of Harm in Copyright: The Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 30 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y 421, 431 (1983). 
  66.  Assume that the new work had a .1% chance of earning an additional $1 million 
and a .01% chance of earning an additional $10 million. Then, its expected earnings 
would increase by (.001 x $1 million) + (.0001 x $10 million) = $1000 + 1000 = $2,000. 
  67.  Even critics of the current level of copyright protection appear to accept this 
rationale. See supra note 7. 
 68.  See Lunney, supra note 63, at 882. 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 803 
 
 
creative projects to become unprofitable and therefore to no longer be 
produced.
69  
In addition, the increased revenues that larger publishers earn due to 
§ 106 that are not spent on promotion are still unlikely to be invested in 
projects expected to be unprofitable. These publishers are no more likely 
to finance “charitable” creative works—that is, to subsidize marginal 
work—than the consumers who would retain their funds absent § 106.
70 
C.  Other Ways Current Copyright Law Chills Creative 
Expression 
Although scholars have overlooked the negative impact of marketing 
on creative output, they have recognized other serious drawbacks to cur-
rent broad copyright protection, particularly the expansive protection of 
“derivative works.”
71 Prior to 1900, § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which 
expressly denies any copyright protection to ideas,
72 was interpreted to 
                                                                                                                         
 69.  See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
  70.  Although the Senate Report accompanying the Copyright Term Extension Act 
states an expectation that publishers will use extra profits to subsidize marginal work, it 
offers no reason why this would arise. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at *12-*13 (1996), 1996 WL 
397400; Lunney, supra note 63, at 874-75 (noting that work that would otherwise be ex-
pected to be profitable would be published anyway and that there is no rational reason 
why publishers would use excess profits to finance works expected to be unprofitable). 
But see David D. Kirkpatrick, CD Price Cuts Could Mean New Artists Will Suffer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at C1. 
 71.  See VAIDHAYANATHAN, supra note 12, passim; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 534-40, 
546-48 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 239 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 49-52 (2002). 
  72.  “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, . . . concept, . . . or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); see also 
Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). This reflects Thomas Jefferson’s observation: 
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for 
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and the improvement of his 
conditions, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed 
by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, 
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which 
we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confine-
ment of exclusive appropriation. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813, in THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 6, 175, 180 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861). As Judge Learned Hand 
emphasized, ideas and plot outlines are “given up to the public” so that authors may draw 
from their predecessors’ innovations and insights.” See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and 
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permit creators to build on the ideas of others to produce creative, trans-
formative works.
73 Nevertheless, as protection of derivative works has 
grown to cover even the “total concept and feel” of a work,
74 the right of 
the copyright owner to deny licenses to other creators has chilled many 
types of transformative uses.
75 These include “fan edits”
76 and “fan fic-
tion,”
77 and even political speech.
78 Since most new creations generally 
                                                                                                                         
Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Judge Learned Hand). 
In fact, when ideas and expression are inseparable, the expression loses copyright protec-
tion. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). 
  73.  Prior to 1900, infringement was evaluated “by looking not so much to what the 
defendant had taken as to what he had added or contributed.” See KAPLAN, supra note 12, 
at 17. 
 74.  See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 
1970) (finding copyright protection for a greeting card’s “total concept and feel”); Alfred 
C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copy-
right in a Work’s ‘Total Concept and Feel’, 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989). Jessica Litman 
finds that § 106(2) now reads as though even thinking about a derivative work is prohib-
ited! See LITMAN, supra note 7, at 22, 32, 71. 
 75.  See LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, passim; VAIDHAYANATHAN, supra note 12, 
passim.  
 76.  See Daniel Zalewski, Thinking These Thoughts is Prohibited, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
6, 2002, §9, at 10. Zaleski writes: 
[A] delightful new art form emerged [in 2001]: the fan edit. Devotees 
of the pop singer Bjork, for example, have begun running her songs 
through their computers, tweaking the beats and instrumentation, then 
posting hundreds of “remixed” versions on the Web. Some of these ed-
its are tone-deaf; others, however, trump the original arrangements. . . . 
Mike J. Nichols, . . . used his Macintosh to make a series of merciful 
cuts to “The Phantom Menace” — most notably, the virtual elimination 
of the irksome Jar Jar Blinks. Fans who obtained a copy of Nichols’s 
“Phantom Edit” through the Internet hailed the arrival of a vastly im-
proved (if not yet good) movie. 
Id.; see also OTA STUDY, supra note 11, at 138-39; Amy Harmon, ‘Star Wars’ Fan Films 
Come Tumbling Back to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at § 2, at 28; Matthew Mira-
paul, If You Can’t Join ’Em, You Can Always Tweak ’Em, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at 
E2 (describing a website that “allows visitors to take six [works of art] at a time and 
combine them into an onscreen collage”). These include mash-ups and bootleg remixes, 
which are based on sampling. See Chris Norris, Mash-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, 
§6 at 102; Neil Strauss, Spreading via the Web, Pop’s Bootleg Remix, N.Y. TIMES, May 
9, 2002, at A1.  
 77.  See  Rebecca  Tushnet,  Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Com-
mon Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997). 
  78. For examples of how copyright law can suppress political expression, see 
Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535-36 (1993), and Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 294-
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primarily reconfigure elements from previous work,
79 Judge Learned 
Hand recognized that the importance of letting works fall into the public 
domain was so later editors “might do a much better job than the origina-
tor.”
80 Thus, it should not be surprising that the derivative works provision 
is probably the most severely criticized aspect of copyright law.
81 
Publishers fearing the cost of lawsuits are apt to decline to publish 
content where others appear likely to claim that it includes or is a deriva-
tive work of theirs, even if such claim appears unreasonable. The problem 
is the cost of litigation. In fact, the chill from the derivative works provi-
sion resembles the one created by many state libel laws before these laws 
were severely diminished by the Supreme Court’s landmark 1964 decision 
in New York Times v. Sullivan.
82 (That holding granted publishers signifi-
cant breathing room to err before they could be convicted of defamation, 
thereby reducing their fear of lawsuits.
83) The Eleventh Circuit did recog-
                                                                                                                         
97 (1996). 
 79.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 332 (“Creating a new work typically in-
volves borrowing or building on material from a prior body of works, as well as adding 
original expression to it.”); infra text accompanying notes 132-137. 
 80.  See LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, at 106. The booming Japanese market in comic 
book stories based on existing characters but by creators other than the original authors 
illustrates the large market demand for such output. See Salil Mehra, Copyright and Com-
ics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My Kid Watches are Japanese 
Imports?, 55 RUTGERS  L.  REV. 155, 164-66 (2002); see also DIGITAL  CONNECTIONS 
COUNCIL OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF DIGITAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
8 (2004) [hereinafter CED REPORT], available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report_-
dcc.pdf (last visited May 9, 2004). 
 81.  See, e.g., David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Fair Use and Transforma-
tive Critical Appropriation (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd-
/papers/langeand.pdf (last visited May 9, 2004); Lunney, supra note 71, at 513, 650; 
Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 53-59; Sterk, supra note 27, at 1217; Naomi Abe Voegtli, 
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1269 (1997). Even access priced 
at “neutral” compulsory license rates, might still hinder some poor, aspiring creators, 
since “there is no particular reason to believe that creative ability will always correlate 
with the ability to pay market price for improvement rights.” Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in 
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
462, 482 n.67 (1998). Jed Rubenfeld would avoid this problem by only granting the 
original work owner a right to sue for profit allocation. Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 59. 
But this raises the issue of what are profits. See Lange & Anderson, supra note 81, at 
143-55. 
  82.  376 U.S. 254 (1965) (striking down a state law that allowed a libel action 
brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct). 
 83.  Id. at 264-65. Unfortunately, the Court failed to take the opportunity to remedy 
this chill when it had the chance in the 1994 parody case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
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nize an outside limit on copyright protection when it dissolved an injunc-
tion against the publication of Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone par-
ody of Gone with the Wind,
84 but the litigation costs were about 
$150,000.
85 Thus, the clear message these cases send to creators (and pub-
lishers) who seek to build on others’ ideas is: if you publish it, they will 
come . . . to get you.
86 
Meanwhile, the fair use exception to copyright protection has only 
limited value due to publisher fears that copyright holders will claim that 
uses are not fair. The fair use doctrine, which permits unauthorized but 
very limited uses of copyrighted content, is supposed to spare creators the 
need to incur the administrative costs of obtaining permission for minor 
uses of others’ materials.
87 Yet the standards for invoking it are so vague 
that creators are often chilled by the fear of litigation.
88 Given that even 
                                                                                                                         
Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The Court in Campbell only held that parodies could qualify as 
“fair use,” thus finding that a rap parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman” 
could be a fair, noninfringing use. Id. The Court remanded the case for consideration of 
the resulting harm to the market for non-parodic rap derivatives of the song. Id.; see 
James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAW  & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 340-48 (2000); Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 59. 
  84.  Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). The 
litigation was settled in May 2002, with defendant Houghton Mifflin agreeing to contrib-
ute an undisclosed amount to Morehouse College. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Mitchell 
Estate Settles ‘Gone with the Wind’ Suit, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at C6. 
 85.  See A Debate on “Creativity, Commerce & Culture” with Larry Lessig and Jack 
Valenti, Annenberg School of Communications, Los Angeles, Cal., at 23-24 (Nov. 29, 
2001) available at http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/LessigValenti.pdf (last visited May 9, 
2004) [hereinafter Lessig & Valenti].  
 86.  Cf. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 1989) (“If you build it, they will come.”); see 
also Chilling Effects, Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, at http://www.chillingeffects.org 
(displaying cease-and-desist letters sent by copyright holders) (last visited Apr. 28, 2004). 
 87.  See Breyer, supra note 15, at 316-18; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market 
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615, 1628-30 (1982). Still, after Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, it is not clear that fair use covers much beyond where a rea-
sonable copyright owner would have consented to the use, and thus a situation that 
should only arise where administrative costs make it impractical to seek permission. See 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2001). 
 88.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 95-99, 185-88, 304-
06 (2004) (discussing how creators refrain from making fair uses of content out of fear of 
litigation, even when top legal scholars tell them that they are clearly in the right), avail-
able at http://cyberlaw-temp.stanford.edu/freeculture.pdf [hereinafter LESSIG, CULTURE]  
(last visited May 15, 2004); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 
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some major Hollywood features have faced court injunctions for lacking 
appropriate clearances,
89 documentary filmmaker Davis Guggenheim con-
cludes that “if any piece of artwork is recognizable by anybody . . . then 
you have to clear the rights of that and pay to use the work.”
90 Yet trying 
to obtain permission to use others’ materials or even simply tracking down 
the rights’ owners requires significant, if not prohibitive, payments.
91 In 
fact, many have recognized that creators, as a class, might actually be bet-
ter off with less copyright protection, since the benefit to creator licensees 
would exceed the harm to the creators whose content was used.
92 The 
Internet and a more efficient online copyright registration procedure, how-
ever, might well alleviate this problem if together they can make it inex-
pensive and practical for creators to procure licenses from copyright hold-
ers.
93 
                                                                                                                         
REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990); Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 21, at 341; Glynn 
S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 988-
91 (2002); Patterson, supra note 71, at 224-26. 
 89.  LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, at 4 (describing the litigation faced by 12 Monkeys, 
Batman Forever, and The Devil’s Advocate). See also Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a 
Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography 
Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 14 n.42 (2000); Copyright Website LLC, at http://benedict.com/visual/visual.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2004). 
 90.  LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, at 3 (quoting Davis Guggenheim). 
 91.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 251-52 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(describing the difficulty of finding the current copyright holders of older works and the 
possibility that such works may have multiple copyright holders); DIGITAL DILEMMA, 
supra note 11, at 65; LESSIG, CULTURE, supra note 88, at 95-97, 101-07, 222-25; LESSIG, 
IDEAS supra note 7, at 3-4. For examples of the problems of identifying who owns a 
copyright see Frances M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping 
the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 919 (2000); Amy Harmon, 
Copyright Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, 
at C1. 
 92.  See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information 
Production, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 88 (2002); Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 
332-34, 337 & n.17; Mehra, supra note 80, at 182-84, 194-96; see also Lunney, supra 
note 71, at 494-97, 513; Dawn C. Nunzianto, Justice Between Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 219 (2002); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Pos-
session, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 556 (1990); cf. Tim O’Reilly, Piracy is Progressive Taxa-
tion, and Other Thoughts on the Evolution of Online Distribution, Dec. 12, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/p2p/2002/12/11/piracy.html (last visited May 9, 
2004). 
 93.  See LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, at 251 (suggesting that the U.S. Copyright Of-
fice operate a website where authors could register their work). The Internet can certainly 
diminish costs for consumptive uses. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Im-
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All economic analyses of copyright recognize that there is a large 
“deadweight loss” to society because publishers protected by copyright set 
prices which deny access to many consumers who would willingly pay the 
marginal or even average cost for creative works.
94 Rewards enhanced by 
§ 106 may also divert some creators into copyright-protected markets and 
away from other, more socially beneficial industry segments or indus-
tries
95—a hidden opportunity cost to society.
96 
Section 106 also enables incumbent media industries to slow the de-
velopment of competing new technologies by denying access to critical 
content. Thus, the film industry tried to stymie television by denying 
broadcasters access to films, both in television’s early years
97 and when 
the broadcasters tried to experiment with pay-TV.
98 In turn, broadcasters 
constrained cable television systems’ access to broadcast programming,
99 
                                                                                                                         
pact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 557, 579-80 (1998); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 236-42 (1996). Rights owners, however, may well refrain from 
automated licensing of productive uses. For discussions of copyright clearinghouses, see 
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 68; LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, at 251, and expe-
dited registration processes, see New Music Jukebox, Am. Music Ctr., at 
http://newmusicjukebox.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
 94.  See KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 153 (1971); Lunney, supra 
note 71, at 556-57, 564-67; Zimran Ahmed, The Copyright Tax, WINTERSPEAK.COM, Feb. 
20, 2002, at http://www.winterspeak.com/columns/022002.html (estimating billions of 
dollars of losses) (last visited May 9, 2004). Such losses are somewhat mitigated by pub-
lic libraries, which offer a small subset of the total content output free to the public. 
 95.  See Lunney, supra note 71, passim (discussing the incentives for individuals to 
invest in creative works); see also Breyer, supra note 15, at 309; Hurt & Schuchman, 
supra note 17, at 430; Lunney, supra note 63, at 888-90; Plant, supra note 7, at 192. 
 96.  See Lunney, supra note 71, at 492 (stating that the “inevitable result of such 
protection is that we will have too many entertaining works, at the expense of having too 
little of everything else”); Lunney, supra note 63, at 880-81; Plant, supra note 7, at 184; 
Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 
30, 40 (1934). 
 97.  See  Douglas  Gomery,  Failed Opportunities: The Integration of the U.S. Motion 
Picture and Television Industries, 10 Q. REV. FILM STUD. 219 (1984). 
  98.  In 1964, some movie theaters successfully pressured major film producers not to 
supply films for the Hartford subscription TV experiment. See Amendment of Part 73 to 
Provide for Subscription Television Service, Fourth Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 
475 (1968). 
  99.  When the Supreme Court rejected broadcasters’ charges that cable television 
system operators’ retransmission of broadcast signals was prohibited by the 1909 Copy-
right Act, broadcasters were still able to prevail upon the FCC and Congress to limit ca-
ble system access to distant broadcast signals and to attractive “pay” shows. See Stanley 
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and cable programmers tried to deny satellite companies access to cable 
networks.
100 Similar defensive industry responses today appear to be hin-
dering the rollout of broadband,
101 digital video recorders,
102 and Internet 
distribution technologies.
103 Furthermore, when manufacturers of existing 
technologies have negotiated over legislative revisions to copyright laws 
they have allocated benefits among themselves, generally slighting new 
media
104 and thereby hindering innovation. Thus the Sonny Bono Act has 
frustrated many innovative uses of the Internet,
105 and other proposed 
                                                                                                                         
Besen & Robert Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 77, 91-110 (1981). 
 100.  See David Waterman, Vertical Integration and Program Access in the Cable 
Television Industry, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 511 (1995). Congress responded to this problem 
by requiring cable networks to deal fairly with satellite distributors. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 548(c)(2)(B) (2000). 
 101.  See Amy Harmon, Hearings on Digital Movies and Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2002, at C4; Remarks of FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, at the National Summit on 
Broadband Deployment, Oct. 25, 2001, at 2, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/-
Powell/2001/spmkp110.html (“Much of what is holding broadband content back is 
caused by copyright holders trying to protect their goods in a digitized environment.”). 
 102.  See Kevin Werbach, Who Controls Information?, RELEASE 1.0, May 31, 2002, 
at 1,17 (“One prominent Silicon Valley VC said he wouldn’t invest in the next Tivo be-
cause it would be a lawsuit waiting to happen.”). 
  103. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding for record companies that sued a Web server that made music 
files available online to customers who already owned the music for copyright infringe-
ment); LESSIG, CULTURE, supra note 88, at 189-99 (the MP3 technology and Internet 
radio). The Movielink Internet service’s five film studio partners have also been sued by 
a competitor, Intertainer, for trying to use their control over films to drive it out of busi-
ness. See Amy Harmon, Black Hawk Downloaded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at G1 
(discussing Morpheus and other video technologies). Larry Lessig contends that the re-
cording industry’s aim seems to be to insure that no venture capitalist invests in a tech-
nology that competes with existing recording industry licensees without the approval of 
the industry, i.e., entry barrier control. See LESSIG, IDEAS, supra note 7, at 200-01. 
 104.  See Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 21, at 299-305. 
  105.  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998), chilled projects like Eric Eldred, Eldritch Press, at http://web.archive.org/-
web/*/http://eldred.ne.mediaone.net (last visited May 3, 2004); Michael Hart’s Project 
Gutenberg,  at http://www.gutenberg.net (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) (free electronic 
books); Internet Archive, at http://www.archive.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); and the 
Prelinger Archives, http://www.prelinger.com/prelarch.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) 
(film archives). See Heather Green, A Library as Big as the World,  BUSINESSWEEK 
ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2002, at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2002/-
tc20020228_1080.htm (last visited May 9, 2004). 810  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
rules would constrain new technological innovations and creative 
works.
106 
Another problem with § 106 is that it appears to increase media con-
centration because merged media firms gain the advantage of having eas-
ier access to cross-license each others’ content. Absent § 106, all publish-
ers would be able to engage in socially beneficial cross uses.
107 
Finally, there are significant costs in enforcing § 106. Any property 
rights structure imposes enforcement costs.
108 In addition to the costs of 
monitoring, negotiating, and litigating, there is also the cost of lost privacy 
and the like, when there is litigation over who has had access to creative 
works. 
III.  INDUCING THE PRODUCTION OF CREATIVE CONTENT 
Both creators and publishers must be motivated to create and dissemi-
nate creative content. Most creators are motivated by non-monetary as 
well as monetary needs or goals, in fact many, if not most, would probably 
create even in the absence of significant financial rewards. On the other 
hand, without adequate financial incentives, few publishers—as busi-
nesses created, generally, to make profits—would appear willing to invest 
the resources required to cover their many costs, as detailed in the rest of 
this section. The business models discussed in Part IV, below, appear to be 
sufficient to generate the needed revenues. 
                                                                                                                         
 106.  See CED REPORT, supra note 80, at 45-59; John L. Zittrain, Taming the Con-
sumer’s Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2002, at A21.  
 107.  RONALD  V.  BETTIG,  COPYRIGHTING  CULTURE:  THE  POLITICAL  ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 101 (1996); Benkler, supra note 92, at 88-89, 92, 94; Yochai 
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of 
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 400-12 (1999); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Enterprise, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1879, 1904-11 (2000) (examining the problem of a small number of conglomerates hold-
ing the rights to creations); see also Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restric-
tion on Non-Infringing Materials—Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity Exter-
nalities, 76 S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1067  (2003); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First 
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1970). Benkler also points out a homog-
enization effect, see Benkler, supra note 92, at 95, and a feedback effect. Id. at 95-98. In 
addition, larger firms are more likely to find it cost effective to survey consumers so as to 
permit them to engage in price discrimination for their libraries of content. Netanel, supra 
note 107, at 1914-17. 
 108.  See Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. 
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A.  Inducing Creators to Create 
Non-pecuniary motivations have long played a major role in stimulat-
ing artistic creations.
109 The joy of simply pleasing audiences
110 or of the 
creative process drives many creative artists.
111 Others see themselves 
simply as vessels to deliver content.
112 Still others seek to praise or punish 
others or to celebrate or mourn some event.
113 The desire for fame, re-
spect, and achievement also motivates many creators.
114 For example, as 
one journalist asserted: “[P]eople who choose journalism [seek] . . . the 
satisfaction of being known and noticed, with your name in print and per-
haps your face on the air; the opportunity to play a part in shaping public 
issues without having to go into politics.”
115 Many seek to prove that they 
                                                                                                                         
 109.  See Plant, supra note 7, at 168-69 (“Some of the most valuable literature that we 
possess has seen the light” without the need for monetary incentives.); see also BRUNO S. 
FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 
(1997). 
  110.  Aaron Copland once testified that he would pay people to listen to his music. 
See Scherer, supra note 65, at 3, 19. 
 111.  See, e.g., CLAUDE SAMUEL, PROKOFIEV 119 (1971) (quoting Sergei Prokofiev’s 
wife who stated that the composer found the supreme joy of life to be “the joy of crea-
tion”); David D. Kirkpatrick, After 2-Year Detour, Grisham Returns to Legal Thrillers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at E1 (quoting John Grisham: “My motives when I started 
were initially pure . . . I didn’t even dream of publishing . . . ‘A Time to Kill’ I wrote for 
the love of the story.”). 
 112.  See M ARTHA  WOODMANSEE,  THE  AUTHOR,  ART AND THE MARKET  (1996). 
Speaking of his writing, Martin Luther said, “Freely have I received, freely given, and 
want nothing in return.” Id. at 159 n.19. 
 113.  See, e.g., DAVID THROSBY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 109 n.13 (2001) (Johann 
Sebastian Bach stated that “the ultimate end or final goal of all music . . . is nothing but 
for the honour of God and the renewal of the soul.”); Ari Posner, No Experience Re-
quired: ‘The O.C.’ Rewrites the Rules of TV Writing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, §2, at 1 
(Josh Schwartz “is the rare writer who uses his work to thank his parents . . . instead of 
exacting revenge on them.”).  
 114.  See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX 
AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 53 (2d ed. 2001) (describing 
ego satisfaction and reputation among hackers); Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 331 
(describing prestige that translates into income); see also OTA STUDY, supra note 11, at 
182-83 (discussing the origin of “Freeware”); Christopher M. Kelty, Free Software/Free 
Science, FIRST  MONDAY, Dec. 2001, available at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/-
issue6_12/kelty/index.html (last visited May 9, 2004). But see David Lancashire, Code, 
Culture and Cash: The Fading Altruism of Open Source Development, FIRST MONDAY, 
Dec. 2001, available at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_12/lancashire/index.-
html (suggesting that a primary cause of the rise of the free software movement may have 
been the immaturity of certain types of software markets) (last visited May 9, 2004). 
 115.  See J AMES  FALLOWS,  BREAKING THE NEWS:  HOW THE MEDIA  UNDERMINE 
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are the best in their field, as certified by a Nobel Prize, Pulitzer Prize, or 
Grammy Award.
116 To achieve fame or generate publicity, some even pay 
to send their work to others.
117 Non-pecuniary motives also lead some to 
participate in community projects to create software.
118 Clearly, social, 
religious, moral, or political goals at least partially motivate some crea-
tors.
119  
                                                                                                                         
AMERICAN  DEMOCRACY 74 (1996). This even leads reporters to risk their lives. See 
Nicholas D. Kristof, A Life of Balances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A25. Kristof 
mourned the death of a Wall Street Journal correspondent, but observed: 
Will Danny Pearl’s death change anything? Will it make reporters more 
careful? I hope so, but I doubt it. The reality is that war is a riveting 
story. It is the route to front-page articles, to Pulitzer Prizes, to promo-
tions. It’s terrifying, grueling, traumatizing, exhilarating. . . . And when 
you get a story out to the world, exposing some misery or brutality, and 
thereby usually making people less brutal or miserable, you feel pride 
at having saved lives. 
Id.  
  116.  Both the Soviet Union and China used state-issued prizes as a socialist mecha-
nism to encourage creation. See Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C. -
A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, DÆDALUS, Spring 2002, at 26, 43. In the United 
States, many treat salaries more as a means to measure their relative standing among their 
peers than for monetary value. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 122-45 (1999). 
  117.  Prior to the Internet, many authors of law review articles paid for reprints to 
send free to potential readers. This emerging “author pays” business model, so readers 
have free access, appears likely to dominate in the scientific community. See  Amy 
Harmon, New Premise in Science: Get the Word Out Quickly, Online, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 2002, at F1.  
  118.  Prominent examples include GNU/Linux (a viable alternative to Windows) and 
Apache (the leading web server). See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and 
the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). Such motivations may also work to 
provide the managerial support to coordinate the decentralized process. See id.; Boyle, 
supra note 6, at 46-47. In fact, this culture led Richard Stallman to create the General 
Public License (“GPL”) for software, under which a creator permits anyone to copy a 
piece of software as long as the copier attaches the GPL and the source code (explaining 
the software) to all copies. See Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the 
Free Software Movement, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLU-
TION (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999); see also GNU General Public License (June 1991), 
available at http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html (discussing the concept of “copyleft”). 
Some creators may be attracted by the philosophy of a “Creative Commons” or other 
niches in the “gift economy.” See, e.g., Creative Commons, at http://www.creative-
commons.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
 119.  See Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 86-95 (1996) (dis-
cussing social and political motivations for art); Joseph Epstein, Think You Have a Book 
in You? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A17 (suggesting that being pub-
lished may provide individuals with the significance that they formerly sought through 
religious salvation). This also applies to some publishers. See infra note 143. 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 813 
 
 
Still, even great artists acknowledge the tremendous importance of fi-
nancial payments. As one scholar has noted,  
Bach, Mozart, Hayden, and Beethoven were all obsessed with 
earning money through their art . . . . Mozart even wrote: “Be-
lieve me, my sole purpose is to make as much money as possi-
ble; for after good health it is the best thing to have.” When ac-
cepting an Academy Award in 1972, Charlie Chaplin remarked: 
“I went into the business for money and the art grew out of it. If 
people are disillusioned by that remark, I can’t help it. It’s the 
truth.”
120 
Moreover, individual creators must pay for costs related to creation of 
their works: materials, production, and possibly marketing costs. They 
must also pay for living expenses and, ideally, recover their opportunity 
costs: the income that they could have earned if they pursued other em-
ployment instead of focusing on creating new content.
121 To feel emotion-
ally satisfied, many also need to feel that they receive their fair share of 
any surplus value they help to create. 
Economists have recognized that standard supply curves, which show 
the relationship between compensation paid to workers and their output, 
while useful for evaluating employees creating more “humdrum” works 
(telephone books, databases, and reference works),
122 fail to accurately 
reflect the incentives of creators, for whom non-monetary goals may well 
dominate monetary ones.
123 For those who are not fully employed as crea-
tors, it appears more appropriate to treat content creation as a leisure time 
activity or investment in the future
124 that is constrained by their ongoing 
                                                                                                                         
 120.  TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 18 (1998). 
 121.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (4th ed. 1992). 
  122.  Those employed by for-profit firms to compile encyclopedias, telephone books, 
databases, etc., are likely to demand wages based on their opportunity cost, and a stan-
dard supply curve would represent them accurately. See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 
17, at 426. Richard Caves calls these “humdrum” inputs. See CAVES, supra note 40, at 4. 
 123.  See  David Throsby, Artists as Workers,  in C ULTURAL  ECONOMICS 201, 202 
(Ruth Towse & Abdul Khakee eds., 1992) (“[A] different set of determinants is likely to 
influence labour supply decisions of artists in arts and nonarts markets.”). See generally 
CAVES, supra note 40, at 2 (“[C]reative goods and services, the processes of their produc-
tion, and the preferences of tastes of creative artists differ in substantial and systematic (if 
not universal) ways from their counterparts in the rest of the economy . . . .”). 
  124.  Many work merely for exposure. See CAVES, supra note 40, at 66 & 359 (noting 
that pursuit of fame leads some musical groups to pay to open up for established groups 
at concerts and that a survey of composers in the 1970s found that their net income from 
composing was negative); Neil Strauss, For Musicians, Microsoft’s Xbox is No Jackpot, 




125 Since at some level of effective wages (or savings or 
family support), a creator will be able to pursue creative work full-time,
126 
such compensation, which leads to the creator’s increased or even full-
time production of creative content, does indeed spur overall creative out-
put. Yet, once certain financial desires are satisfied, money may became 
less of a motivation and the pursuit of fame or the simple need to create 
may become the primary drivers of greater output. As John Grisham ex-
plained, “Money is not that big an issue anymore. It’s not the driving force 
that it was five years ago. I’m a writer. If I didn’t write, what would I do 
all year long?”
127 
Furthermore, even introductory economics textbooks recognize that 
the supply curve for labor is “backward bending” for each person. That is, 
at some point, greater compensation will cause a worker to devote less 
time to work.
128 Although most creators probably never reach that point, 
many famous creators—those who benefit most from copyright protec-
tion—seem to be in the high earnings range where increased compensation 
reduces their incentive to create.
129 Some renowned creators may demand 
                                                                                                                         
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at E1 (discussing how less-famous musicians who provided 
material for Microsoft’s Xbox video game received little if any payment). 
 125.  See THROSBY, supra note 113, at 97, 99, 102, 162-63 (noting that “the artist is 
still assumed to be striving solely for the generation of cultural value but within the limi-
tations imposed by the income requirement” and suggesting a model that “non-arts work 
is simply a means of enabling as much time as possible to be spent at the (preferred) ar-
tistic occupation”); David Throsby, Disaggregated Earnings Functions for Artists,  in 
ECONOMICS OF THE ARTS 331, 334 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger eds., 
1996) (offering “a hypothesis that nonarts work is undertaken by artists essentially as a 
means of satisfying fixed minimum consumption requirements”). Many well known crea-
tors supported themselves, at least in part, with ordinary jobs, e.g., T.S. Eliot (Lloyd’s 
Bank), Wallace Stevens (insurance executive), William Faulkner (power plant), and 
Philip Glass (taxi driver). See COWEN, supra note 120, at 17. 
 126.  See, e.g., MICHAEL FOOT, H.G.: THE HISTORY OF MR. WELLS 29-35 (1995) (dis-
cussing how H.G. Wells quit his job as a biology teacher after the successful publication 
of THE TIME MACHINE (1895)). 
 127.  Kirkpatrick,  supra note 111. 
  128.  Although the opportunity to earn a higher salary generally leads workers to con-
vert more leisure time into work (called the “substitution effect”), the salary also creates 
an “income effect,” whereby one with a higher income chooses to “buy” more hours of 
leisure. See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EX-
TENSIONS 666-77 (7th ed. 1998); Plant, supra note 7, at 192 (noting that, once they have 
earned a sufficient amount, authors “may prefer now to take more holidays or retire ear-
lier.”).  
 129.  See Lunney, supra note 63, at 891-92 (reporting that the reduction in output 
“begins to fall with increasing wages at a wage well below the level that broad copyright 
protection offers popular authors today.”). For example, the majority in Eldred argued 
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substantial sums for future creations, but such requests probably only rep-
resent their desire for the perceived economic rents due them as their fair 
share of total revenues, rather than their need for a sufficient incentive to 
work more hours.
130 It is also important to recognize that many creators 
understand that their need or desire for financial rewards from their crea-
tive works need not come from direct sales of them. As Internet guru 
Esther Dyson has observed, experts often write to enhance their reputa-
tions and earn their income from ancillary services.
131 Most academic 
writing, including law review articles, would seem to fall into that cate-
gory. 
In addition to take-home pay, creators must also secure raw materials 
for their work. Courts have long recognized that all artists to some degree 
build on and borrow from their predecessors. As Justice Story explained,  
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, 
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new 
and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, 
borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was 
well known and used before.
132 
For example, many of Shakespeare’s plots were originated by oth-
ers.
133 In fact, literary imagination may be “but a weaving of the author’s 
experience of life into an existing literary tradition.”
134 Even leading copy-
right advocate Mark Twain acknowledged that “we are all thieves,”
135 and 
                                                                                                                         
that singers Quincy Jones, Bob Dylan, etc., required greater compensation to produce 
more work. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 527 U.S. 186, 207 n.15 (2003). However, lower 
compensation might actually have led them to work more to earn what they wanted. 
 130.  See  David Throsby, A Work-Preference Model of Artist Behaviour,  in C UL-
TURAL ECONOMICS AND CULTURAL POLICIES 69, 78 (Alan Peacock & Ilde Rizzo eds., 
1994) (increased income to artists already working full-time might be treated as rent or 
enable the artist to purchase more and better materials). 
 131.  ROBERT YOUNG & WENDY GOLDMAN ROHM, UNDER THE RADAR: HOW RED 
HAT CHANGED THE SOFTWARE BUSINESS AND TOOK MICROSOFT BY SURPRISE (1999); 
Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, July 1995, at 136.  
  132.  Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436). See also 
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, dissenting).  
 133.  See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 397-99 (rev. ed. 1998); see also 
Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on 
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 167, 176 n.26 (2002). 
 134.  See POSNER, supra note 133, at 403; see also Note, Originality, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1988, 1989-90 & n.5 (2002). 
 135.  VAIDHAYANATHAN, supra note 12, at 55-80 (discussing Twain’s energetic and 
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pop music star Moby agrees, observing that “I’m the composer and the 
musician and the engineer, but also a plagiarist and thief.”
136 While the 
nature and form of the elements copied varies between and within media, 
since virtually all content includes some degree of copying, many have 
challenged the very concept that any one person can be recognized as the 
author.
137 
Those creators that use copyrighted source inputs must license those 
inputs, and this, at least initially, negatively impacts a creator’s output. 
While a very successful creator may recoup this licensing cost and more, 
the need to license source material probably hinders the vast majority of 
only marginally successful creators, some of whom cannot afford to pay 
both the fee and the cost of tracking down whom to pay.
138 New creators 
face lower costs to the extent the material they build upon is available free 
as public domain materials,
139 including content predating copyright or 
with expired copyrights, government publications, facts,
140 or supposedly, 
ideas.
141 They will also benefit from access to work by creators who are 
                                                                                                                         
persistent support for strong copyright protection, despite his borrowing practices). Steal-
ing and adapting material from others was also the norm in vaudeville, as illustrated by 
the Marx Brothers. See id. at 81. 
 136.  Gerald  Marzorati,  All by Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 
32, 35-36. In fact, plagiarism appears to be very common. See VAIDHAYANATHAN, supra 
note 12, at 205-06 n.67; Jon Pareles, Plagiarism in Dylan, Or a Cultural Collage?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2003, at B7. 
 137.  See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 51-60 (1996); Litman, supra note 20, at 965-
67, 1007-13 (1990). See generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL AP-
PROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994). 
 138.  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Op-
portunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 148-53 (2003). 
  140.  Although facts are not subject to copyright under Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to 
change that situation, particularly with respect to commercial databases. See Jane C. 
Ginsburg,  U.S. Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Authorship, in E XPANDING THE 
BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCI-
ETY 55 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, 
Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Sci-
ence and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999) (discussing H.R. 2281 and 
H.R. 354). 
  141.  Although 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) clearly states that ideas are not protected by 
copyright, the protection of derivative works appears to protect ideas as expressed in se-
quels and other such variations. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text. 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 817 
 
 
voluntarily registering their work under a general public license (GPL) or 
the like, making that work available free of charge.
142 
B.  The Financial Needs of Publishers: Costs That Need to be 
Recovered 
Most creators have relied on publishers to handle the tasks involved in 
both preparing final versions of and distributing their creative works (al-
though, as discussed below, the Internet is changing this). Publishers, 
meanwhile, generally undertake these tasks if they believe that they can 
earn at least some small profit
143 after covering their costs. In addition to 
compensation to the creator, publishers’ costs include: selection of con-
tent, preparation of first copy, reproduction and delivery, marketing, in-
surance against failure, and processing of payments. These latter six costs 
have generally absorbed at least eighty-five percent of revenues from crea-
tive content.
144 
The first cost publishers face is finding and selecting creative content. 
Predicting which creations will be profitable requires significant percep-
tiveness about quality and public tastes, as well as luck.
145 The often acci-
                                                                                                                         
  142.  It is only free to those who offer their creative works under the GPL. See supra 
note 118. 
  143.  Academic and a few politically motivated publishers, however, may be willing 
to lose money on publications in the service of other goals, as well as to accept lower 
salaries, see Auletta, supra note 44, at 50, and lower returns than they would for ordinary 
investments. See CAVES, supra note 40, at 44 (describing how many art dealers are “will-
ing to settle for less profit than humdrum entrepreneurs”). Publishers may also use their 
businesses to trumpet their own views and causes. See Benkler, supra note 107, at 378 
n.109 (citing anecdotal evidence that media moguls like Rupert Murdoch and William 
Randolph Hearst used their media to press their personal causes). 
  144.  That is, most creators receive royalties of only about 5-15%. In the musical re-
cording industry, new artists receive nominal royalties of 7% to 12%, superstars 15% or 
more. However, these royalties are subject to many adjustments so that a standard 12% 
royalty on a CD for an independent producer translates into a 3% of retail price royalty to 
the artist, i.e., less than 50¢ on a $15 CD. Still, few CDs earn enough for artists to receive 
more than their advance. See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 42, at 19-23. Com-
posers also receive about 5.7¢ for every track on every copy of every CD and vinyl re-
cord. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.19(e)(4) (2004) . Book publishing industry royalties are some-
what higher. See CAVES, supra note 40, at 56-57 (describing the typical royalty contract 
for trade books as including 10% of the book’s retail price and splitting the gross profit 
58%-42%); Auletta, supra note 44, at 54 (describing the standard as being 10%). 
 145.  See William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, “All Hits are Flukes”: Institutional-
ized Decision Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime Time Program Development, 
99 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1287 (1994); see also ANDRE BERNARD, ROTTEN REJECTIONS: A 
LITERARY COMPANION (1990) (collecting data about many famous book rejections, in-
cluding The Peter Principle (30 times)); VOGEL, supra note 41, at 73 & n.2 (listing fa-
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dental nature of publishing was captured most famously by William 
Goldman’s description: “Nobody knows anything.”
146 Although agents or 
other successful creators often provide a first level of screening,
147 and the 
Internet is helping to cut this cost by facilitating peer group reviewing,
148 
publishers nonetheless invest substantial resources in trying to identify 
worthy content. Interestingly, those that pirate creative works generally do 
not escape this cost simply by selecting creations that have already be-
come best sellers. After all, to make a profit, pirates must accurately pre-
dict the future market for the creative work, i.e., what consumer demand, 
competition, and prices will be like at the time they are actually ready to 
start selling pirated copies to consumers.
149 
Second, a publisher must pay for the preparation of the first copy. 
While new technologies continue to reduce production costs in some crea-
tive markets,
150 creators often need significant funds to complete their 
original work. Although exceptional films have been made for small 
amounts,
151 the performance fees to performers, special effects, travel, 
                                                                                                                         
mous film rejections). 
 146.  See W ILLIAM  GOLDMAN,  ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN  TRADE:  A  PERSONAL 
VIEW OF HOLLYWOOD AND SCREENWRITING 39 (1983); see also Norm Alster, It’s Just a 
Game, But Hollywood is Paying Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 3, at 4. 
 147.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 53-56 (describing the very low acceptance rates—
three or four for every 10,000 submissions received for one publishing company—and 
the role agents play as intermediaries between authors and publishers); see also Celestine 
Bohlen, ‘We Regret We Are Unable to Open Unsolicited Mail’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2001, at E1 (noting that some authors pay the Scott Meredith Literary Agency $450 to 
read and certify the quality of their manuscripts). Many publishers refuse to waste time 
even opening “slush piles” of unsolicited material. Bohlen, supra, at E1; CAVES, supra 
note 40, at 52, 61, 113, 116. 
  148.  See, e.g., Matthew Mirapaul, Aspiring Screenwriters Turn to Web for Encour-
agement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at E2. But see Amy Harmon, Amazon Glitch Un-
masks War of Reviewers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A1. 
  149.  They must predict additional future demand, industry output, and prices. See 
infra section IV.A.1. This is ignored by Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 328-29, de-
spite the note in Breyer, supra note 15, at 298 n.68. 
 150.  See COWEN, supra note 120, at 19-21; Frank Ahrens, A Disturbance in Film’s 
Force, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2002, at E1 (reporting that digital cameras and PC editing 
software are cutting film production costs); David Pogue, Recording Studio in a Box, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at G1. Using computer software to generate virtual actors and 
sets may dramatically cut film production costs. See Dave Kehr, When a Cyberstar is 
Born, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, § 2, at 1; Rick Lyman, Movie Stars Fear Inroads by 
Upstart Digital Actors, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001, at A1. 
 151.  See J OHN  PIERSON,  SPIKE,  MIKE,  SLACKERS AND DYKES:  A  GUIDED  TOUR 
ACROSS A DECADE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENT CINEMA 17, 18, 52 (1995) (referencing 
Wayne Wang’s Chan is Missing ($20,000), John Sayles’s Return of the Secaucus Seven 
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crew wages, etc. can be quite costly.
152 Furthermore, talented personnel 
sought for a creative work may inflate their fee requests if they expect 
there to be a surplus on the project.
153 Musical recording costs for rela-
tively new artists’ albums by major studios range from $80,000 to 
$150,000.
154 Publishers also must often provide significant amounts of 
artistic, strategic, and psychological support to creators, particularly art-
ists, at the beginning of their careers.
155 
Third, publishers must pay for the reproduction and delivery of crea-
tive works, although digital technologies have dramatically reduced these 
costs. For example, hardcover books can now be produced in high volume 
for about $2 per copy, high-end paperbacks, CDs, and DVDS for about 
$1.
156 New reproduction technologies have also dramatically reduced the 
cost savings of a large production run, making smaller runs that respond to 
customer demand more feasible.
157 The average cost of transporting hard 
copies of creative works, i.e., distributing books to retailers, is about $2 
per copy.
158 Publishers generally employ private wholesalers and distribu-
tors who transport hard copies to tens of thousands of retail outlets.
159 To 
avoid lost sales that may never be recovered, publishers also generally err 
on the side of overproduction, which increases production costs. Publish-
ers generally expect returns of about 35% for frontlist hardcovers, 25% for 
                                                                                                                         
($60,000), and Spike Lee’s She’s Gotta Have It ($114,000)). 
 152.  See generally 2002 MPA STATS, supra note 39 (describing MPAA cost aver-
ages). Even simply transferring a typical previously produced Hollywood film from a 
35mm print to a “cleaned up” 70mm IMAX version can cost between $2 and $4 million. 
See Rick Lyman, Imaxing Hollywood Hits for a Big, Seat-Shaking Second Helping of 
Thrills, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at E1. 
 153.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 109 (warning about “the common fallacy of re-
garding a film’s costs as exogenous to its expected revenues”); Laura M. Holson, Big 
Hollywood Hits Don’t Ensure Big Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at C1. 
 154.  See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 42, at 23. Still, software for digital 
audio workstations is available for $1,000 (plus special effects) and studios rent for as 
little as $20/hour. 
 155.  See, e.g., Martin Arnold, Making Books: With Editors Up Their Sleeves, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at E3; Hirschberg, supra note 41; Jay Parini, Saluting All the King’s 
Mentors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at E1. 
 156.  See VOGEL, supra note 41, at 162; David D. Kirkpatrick, Some Book Buyers 
Read the Price and Decide Not to Read the Rest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, § 1, at 1; 
Rick Lyman, In Revolt in the Den, DVD Has the VCR Headed to the Attic, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2002, at A1. 
 157.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 144. 
 158.  See Auletta, supra note 44, at 54. 
 159.  See id. at 60; COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 54, at 69, 123, 160, 381; KRA-
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trade paperbacks the first year of publication (20% thereafter), and 40-
50% for mass market paperbacks.
160 Meanwhile, personal computers and 
the Internet have dramatically cut the cost of reproduction and delivery of 
digital versions of creative content. Thus, online publishers are offering 
about 100,000 new titles a year at little cost under a print-on-demand sys-
tem, even if the lion’s share are not worth reading.
161 The MP3 standard 
compresses one minute of music to a mere one megabyte of data, which 
can be transmitted in about three minutes via a 56K modem (seventeen 
minutes for a five-minute song), while a whole album can be sent via a 
high-speed connection in eighteen minutes.
162 Even Hollywood films can 
be disseminated online over broadband connections.
163 Still, while 
younger consumers may soon rely primarily on e-versions, hard copies of 
most creations are likely to be quite popular for a long time, particularly 
for gifts.
164 
The fourth and often most important element of selling content is the 
enormous expense of marketing a work effectively. While the Internet al-
ready helps cut promotional costs by enabling publishers to offer free 
online access to excerpts of their books, music, or video,
165 or even an in-
                                                                                                                         
 160.  See FELDMAN, supra note 44, at 24. 
 161.  See Gayle Feldman, Got a Book in You? More Companies Than Ever are Will-
ing to Get it Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at C6; Taub, supra note 57, at G1. Creators 
can also post shorter creations on weblogs or disseminate them via email. See Judith 
Shulevitz,  At Large in the Blogsphere, N.Y.  TIMES, May 5, 2002, §  9, at 31; Bob 
Tedeschi, Internet Experts Wonder if Weblog Technology is a Powerful New Media Spe-
cies, or Just Another Fad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at C6. 
 162.  See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 77. Real Audio and MP3.com also 
pioneered the use of streaming audio (and video). Whole bundles of all the songs on an 
album as well as the CD’s artwork are increasingly available as zip files. See  Neil 
Strauss, A Boxed Set in One File? Online Music Finds a Way, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, 
at E1. 
 163.  See Ku, supra note 13, at 303-04 (observing that this eliminates the need for 
publishers to finance this cost); Harmon, supra note 103, at G1 (discussing Morpheus and 
other video technologies).  
  164.  The current generation of adults is likely to remain more comfortable with 
printed books and magazines. See generally W. Russell Neuman, The Media Habit, in 
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING PLUS 5, 8-9 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1985); Matthew Rose, E-
Books Have a Big Future, But It’s Unlikely to Come Anytime Soon, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 
2000, at B1. Still, e-books appear to be gaining popularity. See Peter S. Menell, Envision-
ing Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 128-29 (2002-03). 
 165.  See Authors, Publishers Say Book ’Em—Online, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2002, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2002/02/07/books-online.htm (last 
visited May 15, 2004); Matt Richtel, Access to Free Online Music is Seen as a Boost to 
Sales, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2002, at C6; Anthony Tommasini, Click to Download Scores 
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ferior quality copy of the whole work,
166 use of the traditional media, par-
ticularly television, remains crucial.
167 Promotional costs and their signifi-
cance were already discussed in some detail in Section II.B, above. In-
creased use of the buyer-financed, Internet-empowered selection assis-
tants, discussed in IV.A.4, however, could dramatically reduce these costs 
of publication. 
A fifth publishing cost is the need to insure against the risk of failure. 
The unpredictability of consumer tastes makes investment in the produc-
tion of creative content so risky that investors must be offered enormous 
prizes for their rare winners.
168 Publishers can partly reduce the cost of 
failure by using royalties rather than large advances,169 but because many 
participants are unwilling to trust publisher judgments or accounting, they 
demand set fees based on expected revenues. This leads publishers to lose 
on most creative works.
170 Publishers also suffer from the effects of “the 
                                                                                                                         
by New American Composers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at E1 (discussing the American 
Music Center’s New Music Jukebox: newmusicjukebox.org); Amazon.com, at 
http://www.amazon.com (last visited Apr. 29, 2004) (providing a function called “Look 
Inside,” which displays excerpts from selected books). Amazon is even experimenting 
with offering online text searches of books. See Lisa Guernsey, In Amazon’s Text Search, 
a Field Day for Book Browsers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at G7. 
 166.  See infra note 202  
  167.  Even the dot.com companies recognize this, and they purchased most of the ads 
for the 2000 Super Bowl game. See Kathryn Kranhold, The Real Action: Ad Bowl XXIV, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2000, at B1; see also Neil Strauss, Forget Radio, Music Path to 
Success is TV, TV, TV, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at E1.  
 168.  See Scherer, supra note 65, at 15. The situation is somewhat analogous to that in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Although the revenues that drug companies earn on their 
biggest successes may appear obscene, those rewards may be justified by the enormous 
costs of failed projects. See Robert Pear, Research Cost for New Drugs Said to Soar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at C1, (finding the cost of developing a new drug now aver-
ages $802 million, according to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6 (last visited May 15, 
2004)). 
  169.  Executive egos, however, may prevent this. See Pareles, supra note 61, §2, at 
28. For a general discussion of sharing risks between publisher and creator see WATT, 
supra note 6, at 71-107. 
 170.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 113-14; PIERCE O’DONNELL & DENNIS MCDOU-
GAL, FATAL SUBTRACTION (1992); Lunney, supra note 63, at 876-77. This yields lottery-
like payout patterns. See CAVES, supra note 40, at 61-62, 102, 120 (estimating that 1/3 to 
1/2 of independent films never even find distributors and that 76% of musicals and 80% 
of stage plays lose money); de Vany & Walls, supra note 40, at 285 (stating that films are 
among the riskiest products with their data showing an infinite variance); Lunney, supra 
note 63, at 878 n.205; Pareles, supra note 61 (stating that 90% of albums do not break 
even); Scherer, supra note 65, at 12-15. But see Breyer, supra note 15, at 296 n.66 (esti-
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winner’s curse,” where the winning bidder for some creative work is the 
one that makes the most unrealistically high estimate of the value of a 
property, and thus suffers from this overpayment.
171 As noted above, copi-
ers intending to sell hard copies do not avoid all of this risk, since they are 
forced to estimate future demand, competition, and prices, creating their 
own comparable risks. 
Finally, publishers need to recover their cost of processing payments, 
i.e., transferring funds from the consumer to themselves. The use of credit 
cards and online payment systems that delegate the work to buyers (who 
may be aided by electronic passports) is reducing the cost of this process, 
while the emergence of new micro-payment technologies
172 should make 
it practical to collect even small fees and donations. 
IV.  SOURCES OF FINANCIAL REWARDS ABSENT § 106’s 
BROAD PROTECTION AGAINST COPYING 
To generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of production and 
dissemination of all types of creative works, as just reviewed in Part III, 
there must be at least one viable business model for each media market 
segment. As the discussion below makes clear, many relevant business 
models can function effectively without § 106’s prohibition against unau-
thorized copying. Rather, these business models rely on a combination of 
new and existing technologies, social norms, and copyright laws other 
than § 106’s broad protection against unauthorized copying.
173  
This section attempts to present a comprehensive survey and concep-
tual assessment of the relevant business models for financing the creation 
of content.
174 Many of these methods depend primarily on technology, but 
                                                                                                                         
mating that 85% of textbooks are profitable).  
 171.  CAVES, supra note 40, at 142-43; Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s 
Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (1988).  
 172.  See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
  173.  This analysis of business models draws somewhat on Professor Lawrence Les-
sig’s observation that human behavior is regulated by four interdependent constraints—
architectures (technologies), social norms, markets (prices), and laws. LAWRENCE LES-
SIG, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998), in CODE AND OTHER LAWS 
OF CYBERSPACE 87-99 (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE]. Lessig’s focus, however, was 
quite different than the one in this Article. He was concerned with how changes in archi-
tecture, social norms, and markets had changed the justification for laws or how one 
should interpret the Constitution. The National Research Council recognized the rele-
vance of Lessig’s four modalities to copyright. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 52-
54. 
 174.  See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE 
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social norms and some government funding and limited legal protection 
are also important. In addition, most involve selling creative content di-
rectly but some also rely on general, indirect payments like tips and dona-
tions. Most could apply to both electronic copies distributed online and 
physical copies distributed trough traditional channels. But some would 
work only for one type of distribution or the other.  
A.  Using Technology to Generate Revenues From Creative Works  
A publisher’s ability to sell access to creative content depends largely 
on the existence of technologies that allow them to provide buyers with 
limited access to the content. Although publishers usually criticize new 
technologies as threatening their existing business models and requiring 
additional legal protection,
175 new media have repeatedly spawned un-
precedented ways to convert the social value of creative works into reve-
nues and profits.
176 For example, recording music on piano rolls, then vi-
nyl disks, and so, on enabled publishers to sell musical performances. The 
invention of motion pictures allowed many writers and producers of plays 
to sell performances of screenplays. In each case, the key to capturing new 
revenue was creating new business models to suit the new technologies.
177 
For example, when developers introduced the first videocassette recorders 
(VCRs) in 1982, MPAA President Jack Valenti testified that “the VCR is 
to the motion picture industry and the American public what the Boston 
strangler is to the woman alone.”
178 But the film industry adapted and by 
the 1990s a film’s income from videotapes dwarfed all other revenue 
streams.
179 
                                                                                                                         
L.J. 1805 (1995). 
 175.  See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 78-79; Landes & Posner, supra note 5, 
at 330, 363. Copyright owners also commonly see the emergence of new technologies as 
an opportunity for them to supplement their rights. See David Nimmer et al., The 
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 44-45 (1999). 
 176.  See CED REPORT, supra note 80, at 18-22, 68-73.  
 177.  See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 177-79; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 22. 
 178.  See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, 
H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5750 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1983) 
(testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
 179.  See COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 158, at 381, 411-22; Sharon Waxman, 
Studios Rush to Cash in on DVD Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at E1. Similar situa-
tions have arisen in other market segments, such as publishing, sound recording, and 
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In summary, new technologies have created the potential to dramati-
cally reduce publisher costs—including marketing—enough to make it 
much more practical for new creators to finance publication without the 
broad protections of § 106. 
1.  Pre-sales to Consumers 
Publishers can attempt to cover all of their costs by seeking that 
amount in prepayments from consumers. Of course, only certain types of 
content are likely to attract buyer interest in such an arrangement. 
Pre-sales to distributors, rather than consumers, are already common in 
the film industry. Under pre-sale arrangements, production companies ob-
tain financial commitments from foreign distributors, pay-TV networks, 
and home video before production even starts,
180 although they generally 
only cover a portion of a publisher’s total costs. Similarly, newspaper and 
magazine publishers generally only recover a portion of their total costs 
from their subscribers. For other types of creative content, the Internet ap-
pears to make it practical to pre-sell in two ways: a) specific content to 
consumers before it is even produced and b) give consumers discretion to 
credit their prepayment to one of a number of competing works, after the 
works have been completed. The first of these pre-sale arrangements, 
however, is generally only practical for creators with large and enthusias-
tic fan bases. Furthermore, pre-sale arrangements in general are vulnerable 
to free riders who may decline to pre-buy, with the hope that others will 
pay the full cost and permit the free rider to get access at no cost.
181 
a)  Pre-sales of a Specific Creative Work 
The first type of pre-sale involves a specific single creative work, 
which the consumer makes a pre-production commitment to purchase 
once it is available. The Internet makes it practical for publishers to di-
rectly contact prior purchasers of a creator’s work or others who appear to 
have enjoyed it and to solicit them directly and relatively inexpensively 
for pre-sales. For example, the popular British band Marillion collected an 
e-mail list of 25,000 fans and successfully solicited them for £200,000 in 
pre-sale orders for a £16 album in just a few weeks.
182 Another example is 
Stephen King’s online serial publication of chapters of a new novel, The 
                                                                                                                         
 180.  See VOGEL, supra note 41, at 61. Theater and concert producers also pre-sell 
season subscriptions. 
 181.  See Breyer, supra note 15, at 303-04. 
  182.  Marillion sold 10 million albums and, had a huge hit with “Kayleigh.” See MI-
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Plant. Although the payment system resembled a “shareware” model be-
cause he requested voluntary payments after receipt of a chapter, the 
online publication was also a form of pre-sale because King made his of-
fering of new chapters contingent on receiving sufficient payments for 
previous chapters. King’s effort was profitable but only partially success-
ful: the percentage of downloaders who paid was below King’s threshold 
and he stopped publishing online.
183 
Although King’s online experiment shows that the pre-sale model is 
susceptible to free riding, the model has attracted the interest of some art-
ists.
184 Under this type of pre-sale, a publisher or artist would post online 
the total dollar amount it required to finance and make a reasonable profit 
on a new creation. A deadline for meeting this goal could be set and con-
sumers could be asked to pay either a fixed price for a single order or to 
make a variable contribution that would help meet the goal.
185 Even poten-
tial free riders would have a strong incentive to contribute some amount to 
ensure that the new work they desired was produced, at least if total pre-
sales appeared likely to fall short of the total needed. Creators and pub-
lishers could use the techniques of bidding sites, like eBay, to capture 
funds by allowing bidders to choose last minute default strategies that em-
powered them to offer an amount as high as they were willing to pay if the 
work they desired would otherwise not be produced.
186 
                                                                                                                         
  183.  King’s initial arrangement was to publish chapters of The Plant and request $1 
donations from each reader for each chapter. King would publish subsequent chapters as 
long as 75% of those downloading paid for the privilege. See Comment: Publishing: Not 
So Fast, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2000, at A20. After less than 50% of downloaders paid for 
the sixth installment, King stopped writing. Still, King apparently made a profit of 
$450,000 on revenues of $720,000 from the project. Marketing & Media, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 8, 2001, at B10; see also Lunney, supra note 63, at 863-64. There is, however, a 
danger that some will game the system. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 303-04. 
 184.  See Chris Nelson, Pearl Jam, On its Own, Seizes the Moment and Sells CD on 
the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at C10; Charles C. Mann, The Year the Music Dies, 
WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 90, 93 (Phish, Prince, and Wonderlick). It has also attracted the 
interest of a middleman. See  OpenCulture.org,  at http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://-
www.openculture.org/ (last visited May 6, 2004). 
  185.  Conditionally binding assurance contracts are in widespread use in magazine 
and book sales, see Palmer, supra note 19, at 299, as is holding funds in escrow. See John 
Kelsey & Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital Copyrights, FIRST 
MONDAY, June 1999, 8-10, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_6/kelsey/ (last 
visited May 15, 2004); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Own-
ership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121, 1150-51 
(2003). 
  186.  This would help if insufficient funds were promised, although the real demand 
exceeded the cost. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 304; John Perry Barlow, The Economy of 
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As seen with the Marillion and King examples, this type of pre-sale ar-
rangement is most suitable for creators that are already well-known, but 
lesser-known creators could also use this arrangement if they secured rec-
ommendations from critics or other institutions whose judgments have 
earned credibility among consumers. Subscriptions to magazines follow 
this model since the consumer is pre-purchasing a package of articles, of-
ten from unknown writers, based on the reputation of the publisher. 
Another version of pre-sales of specific works would enable publishers 
to allow buyers to reduce their risks by basing the price ultimately charged 
on the quality of the reviews a new work received. Thus, consumers would 
commit to pay some maximum price, but if the “quality” of the offering 
was below some designated level they would be due a specified refund. 
For example, an album could be priced for presale at varying price levels 
depending on whether a designated reviewer rated its artistic quality with 
3, 2, or 1 “stars.”
187 
b)  Discretionary Pre-sales 
The second type of pre-sale would give buyers a bit more discretion. 
Buyers would merely commit to purchase one of a set of content pack-
ages. For example, textbook publishers would designate a webpage for 
displaying all of the potentially competing textbooks that they were con-
sidering publishing for a particular course. They would also indicate on 
the webpage how much total buyer demand for the set of texts would be 
needed to trigger them to commission one or more relevant texts. Thus, 
one publisher might be willing to commission one freshman-level, ad-
vanced algebra textbook if demand exceeded $2 million and a second if 
demand exceeded $3.5 million. Schools desiring to use a new advanced 
algebra would then commit to contribute some total amount, not counting 
printing costs, to purchase copies of one of the relevant available texts. To 
the extent that schools saw that total demand was insufficient to trigger the 
commissioning of any new texts they would have to decide whether to live 
with that or to raise their contributions. If they wanted to be able to choose 
                                                                                                                         
Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 1994, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html (last visited May 15, 
2004). 
  187.  To avoid delegating too much power to any one review, prices could depend on 
how many of a specified group of reviewers gave the content a specific rating. Reliance 
on a large enough group would dilute the power of any one critic and make bribery less 
likely. Another way for trusted entities to reduce the risks of corruption without the need 
for too many critics would be for the entities to select a few expert critics and announce 
results without disclosing which experts they relied upon for the particular work. 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 827 
 
 
from multiple texts they would have a strong incentive to help insure that 
total commitments reached the level needed to trigger that number of texts 
from publishers. This mechanism would replace the current “spot market” 
(where purchasers are made on an “as needed” basis) in textbooks with 
contracts that, while discretionary, also guarantee revenues to some pub-
lishers without dampening publisher incentives to compete.
188 
2.  Versioning and Offering Services in Place of Products 
Publishers can also increase their revenues from the sale of creative 
work by setting different prices for different versions of it,
189 that is, dis-
criminatory prices, which take advantage of some consumers’ willingness 
to pay more to get access to superior forms of the desired content. For ex-
ample, publishers release hardbound versions of novels before cheaper 
paperback versions to capture revenues from those willing to pay more for 
earlier access. New technologies are increasing their ability to offer multi-
ple versions of content. Film studios have long taken advantage of such 
prior technologies, and most now generally maximize their revenues by 
releasing a film first to theaters, than on videocassettes/DVDs, next on 
pay-per-view, then on pay cable, and finally on network TV.
190 
Creators can already earn substantial fees for live performances even 
when free recordings are available.
191 Thus, the Grateful Dead relied sub-
stantially on compensation for their live performances while encouraging 
their fans to make and circulate bootleg recordings.
192 Celebrity journalists 
already earn significant “entertainer” fees for presenting news analyses in 
                                                                                                                         
  188.  The website CollabNet, at http://www.collab.net (last visited Apr. 29, 2004), 
already occasionally hosts markets of this type to finance new software. 
 189.  See  CARL  SHAPIRO  &  HAL  R.  VARIAN,  INFORMATION  RULES 53–81 (1999) 
(discussing versioning strategies). 
 190.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 168-69; VOGEL, supra note 41, at 84-85; David 
Waterman, Prerecorded Home Video and the Distribution of Theatrical Feature Films, in 
VIDEO  MEDIA  COMPETITION:  REGULATION,  ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 221 (Eli 
Noam ed., 1985). 
 191.  See Ku, supra note 13, at 308-09; Brett May & Marc Singer, Unchained Mel-
ody, MCKINSEY Q., No. 1, 2001, at 128, 136-37. But see CAVES, supra note 40, at 66 
(describing how in the 1960s, touring pop groups received extensive local airplay yet had 
several money-losing tours); Healey, supra note 42 (“While concerts can sustain an es-
tablished band with a fervid national following, new artists generally don’t make money 
when they venture away from home.”). Small “house concerts” may also be profitable. 
See Eric Brace, House Music, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at T32. Schools and students 
pay academics dramatically more for their live presentations of textbook content (teach-
ing) than for the creations themselves. 




193 Likewise, the superior audio and visual experience of 
theatrical movie showings, particularly for films with cutting edge special 
effects or lush scenery,
194 is likely to be substantially more attractive than 
even free bootlegged DVDs of the film. Although the use of special 
glasses and polarized projections to produce three-dimensional images in 
movie theaters has not yet proved to be a practical offer, it is probably not 
long before holograph technologies may enable theaters to offer versions 
of a creative work that are both highly valued by consumers and too ex-
pensive and impractical for copiers to attempt to duplicate. 
New technologies now allow creators to offer consumers “customized” 
versions of their works to meet the particular aural or visual constraints of 
the buyer’s environments or tastes.
195 Creators may offer consumers en-
hanced versions of their work that permit consumers to “participate” in the 
work.
196 The technology of karaoke already enables consumers to inject 
their voices into a creative work. The economical practicality of custom-
ized printings of books can permit consumers to replace a character in a 
story with someone they want to surprise with a gift. Future technologies 
should permit consumers to insert their faces and bodies into films. As 
Ithiel de Sola Pool observed nearly two decades ago, publishers in some 
media industries could transform their business from providing a product 
to providing a service: enhanced access to content.
197 
In certain markets, publishers could also offer consumers supplemen-
tary content that adds value to the original work, including commentary on 
a film, book, or song, or crossword puzzle hints,
198 Access in multiple for-
                                                                                                                         
 193.  See FALLOWS supra note 115, at 88. But see id. at 103-28 (concerning ethical 
issues). 
  194.  These may soon be further enhanced by IMAX technology. See Lyman, supra 
note 152. IMAX technology allows viewers to feel as if they are a part of the film, as 
opposed to merely viewing the film. IMAX® Cinema, Science Museum, at http://www.-
sciencemuseum.org.uk/imax/imaxtechnology.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
 195.  See Kevin Kelly, Where Music Will Be Coming From, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 29, 31. 
  196.  Artwork that allowed the purchaser to participate would be another special op-
tion. See Matthew Mirapaul, Selling and Collecting the Intangible, at $1,000 a Share, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at E2 (discussing the sale of “shares” in an online work to 
owners who can alter the work). 
 197.  See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Whither Electronic Copyright, in ELECTRONIC PUBLISH-
ING PLUS 217, 226-27 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1985); see also Nimmer et al., supra note 
175, at 35; Barlow, supra note 186; Steve Lohr, An Internet Pioneer of the 90’s Looks to 
a Future in Software, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at C1 (discussing the licensing of Op-
sware). 
 198.  See Chris Nelson, Trying To Sell CDs by Adding Extras, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
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eign language options is already often available. For some other works, 
creators might also offer enhanced access in the form of linked sets of 
content that permit easy jumping between or within works of scholarship 
or even art.
199 
In response to copiers, authorized online music services may publicize 
their comparative advantages (and justification for higher prices): quick 
access to reputable copies of music.
200 These authorized sources may be-
come particularly significant if free online content is commonly infected 
with harmful viruses, adware, or fakes.
201 In certain markets, buyers are 
also often willing to buy clean hard copies even of content, such as news-
papers or books, available free online.
202  
3.  Advertising 
Publishers have also helped finance creative content by selling adver-
tising, including display ads in newspapers and magazines, television 
commericals and product placements within television shows and movies. 
Such media industry advertising currently totals about $130 billion annu-
ally.
203 While some new technologies are hurting this business model, oth-
                                                                                                                         
2003, at C7; Alex Salkever, The Battle of the Online Content Models, BUSINESSWEEK 
ONLINE (May 13, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/ (noting that the N.Y. TIMES sells 
access to crossword puzzle hints and “TimesTalks Online” for $5.95 per stream). 
 199.  See Matthew Mirapaul, Today’s Publishing: Better by the Book or by the Web?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at E2 (discussing the presentation of stories as a “dynamic and 
kinetic experience”). 
 200.  See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 80-81; Amy Harmon, What Price Mu-
sic?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, § 2, at 1; John Schwartz & John Markoff, Power Play-
ers: Big Names are Jumping Into the Crowded Online Music Field, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2004, at C1. 
  201.  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emer-
gence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA.  L.  REV. 505, 583-85 
(2003); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Software Bullet is Sought to Kill Musical Piracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2003, § 1, at 1 (discussing RIAA efforts at sabotage); John Schwartz, 
When Free Isn’t Really Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 3, at 1. 
  202.  Even when newspapers are available free online, consumers generally prefer 
hard copies. Hsiang Iris Chyi & Dominic L. Lasorsa, An Explorative Study on the Market 
Relation Between Online and Print Newspapers, 15 J. MEDIA ECON. 91 (2002). This also 
appears to apply to books. See LESSIG, CULTURE, supra note 88, at 284-85 (discussing 
other books, while his own book also illustrates the point); Eric Flint, Prime Palaver #6, 
Apr. 15, 2002, available at http://www.baen.com/library/palaver6.htm (last visited May 
15, 2004). It may also apply to music. See Chris Nelson, Upstart Labels See File Sharing 
as Ally, Not Foe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at C1; Peer-to-Peer Music Trading: Good 
Publicity or Bad Precedent?, Knowledge@Wharton, Oct. 9, 2002, available at http://-
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articles.cfm?catid=4&articleid=635&homepage=yes. 
  203.  This includes about $45 billion for newspapers, see Annual Newspaper Advertis-
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ers are helping to increase its effectiveness. Television remote controls, 
which enable viewers to “zap” commercials with the mute button or avoid 
them by channel surfing, have long distressed TV advertisers.
204 Para-
mount Pictures has even challenged the legality of the TiVo and Re-
playTV digital video recorder (DVR) technologies, which empower view-
ers to automatically eliminate commercials during playback or even when 
watching a live broadcast on a slightly-delayed (almost real time) basis.
205 
Similarly, new online “screens” enable net surfers to view web pages 
stripped of their commercial messages.
206 Of course, advertisers have long 
responded to these technologies by offering commercials that are too en-
tertaining for viewers to want to skip.
207  
Publishers have also long recognized the value of “product place-
ments,” which capture audiences by embedding advertised products in en-
tertainment content.
208 This practice may increasingly pervade books
209 
                                                                                                                         
ing Expenditures, Newspaper Assoc. of Am., at http://www.naa.org/artpage.cfm?AID=-
1566&SID=1022 (last updated Feb. 2004); $42 billion for television programs, see 2003 
TV Ad Revenue Figures, Television Bureau of Advertising, at http://www.tvb.org/-
rcentral/index.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); $20 billion for radio, see Radio Advertis-
ing Revenues, Radio Advertising Bureau, at http://www.rab.com; and $18 billion for 
magazines, see Magazine Advertising Revenue and Pages for PIB Measured Magazines, 
Magazine Publishers of Am., at  http://www.magazine.org/Advertising_and_PIB/Ad_-
Trends_and_Magazine_Handbook/1238.cfm (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). It does not in-
clude the increasing amounts collected by movie theaters. 
 204.  See, e.g., Dennis Kneale, ‘Zapping’ of TV Ads Appears Pervasive, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 25, 1988, at 29. But see Bill Carter, TV Industry Unfazed by Rise in ‘Zapping’, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 8, 1991, at D1. 
 205.  See Amended Complaint, Paramount Picts. Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., Civ. No. 
01-09358 (filed C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2001) ¶  17, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/-
Video/Paramount_v_ReplayTV/20011121_paramount_amd_complaint.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2004); LEWIS, supra note 182, at 165-90; Eric A. Taub, Reply TV’s New Owners 
Drop Features That Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at C3. 
 206.  See Saul Hansell, As Consumers Revolt, a Rush to Block Pop-Up Online Ads, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at C1; David Pogue, Puncturing Web Ads Before They Pop 
Up, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at G1. 
  207.  See Bill Carter, NBC is Hoping Short Movies Keep Viewers From Zapping, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at C1; Joe Flint, Super Bowl’s 30-Second Ad Rush: Forget Pigskin; 
Real Action For Sunday’s Game Lies in What Commercials Fly, WALL ST. J , Jan. 26, 
2001, at B1. Broadcasters even offer packages comprised solely of creative ads, see, e.g., 
Superbowl’s Greatest Commercials, CBS Broadcasting Inc., http://www.cbs.com/-
specials/2004_superbowl_commercials (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); Classic TV, 
About.com, at http://classictv.about.com/cs/commercials (last visited Apr. 29, 2004). 
  208.  See Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood 
Turning Films into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 301-11 (1992); Stu-
art Elliot, On ABC, Sears Pays to be Star of New Series, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at C1; 




210 The Internet, however, is increasingly allowing prod-
uct placements to give audiences the chance to make an actual impulse 
purchase of such products, e.g., fashions worn on Sex in the City and mu-
sic heard on Dawson’s Creek.
211 These offerings are not yet seamless, but 
technology should soon permit this, as well as enabling consumers to gain 
quick access to more information about a product of interest.
212 This 
should make product placements substantially more valuable to advertisers 
and thus a larger source of funding for creators. 
Second, media firms are improving their ability to target consumers 
with customized or enhanced ads based on the user’s interaction with the 
medium.
213 Because such ads are of more interest and value to consumers, 
they will be less disturbing, and this should make advertisers willing to 
pay higher fees. One problem with relying on an advertiser-support busi-
ness model, however, is the well recognized danger that advertisers will 
use their financial influence to distort editorial or artistic content.
214 
4.  Consumer Selection Assistants 
The Internet facilitates a shift away from biased, seller-financed mar-
keting messages and towards consumer financed selection assistance that 
serves the individual customer’s personal tastes. The Internet already pro-
                                                                                                                         
Brian Steinberg, Chapstick Chiller: Lip Balm Lands Role in Scary Movie, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 23, 2002, at B7C (“Having characters eat a particular food product can cost between 
$250,000 and $500,000 [or more].”). 
 209.  See Snyder, supra note 208, at 308; David D. Kirkpatrick, Now, Many Words 
From Our Sponsor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, at A1 (reviewing Fay Weldon’s THE 
BULGARI CONNECTION, a novel at the center of much controversy for featuring paying 
product placements). Advertisers even sponsor school materials. See David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Snack Foods Become Stars of Books for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 
2000, at A1. 
 210.  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 195, at 31. 
  211.  For example, asseenin.com provides data about products featured on a number 
of television programs. See also David F. Gallaher, New Service Offers Made-to-Order 
CD’s From TV Show, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at C4; Nancy Hass, “Sex” Sells, in the 
City and Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, § 9, at 1; Bob Tedeschi, Recent Snafus at 
the Online Shops of TV Networks Have Barely Dimmed the Glow of Merchandising on 
the Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2002, at C8.  
 212.  See Amy Harmon, Skip-the-Ads TV Has Madison Ave. Upset, N.Y. TIMES, May 
23, 2002, at A1 (noting that DVRs can offer expanded versions of ads). 
 213.  See Bob Tedeschi, If You Liked the Web Page, Try the Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2003, at C1.  
 214.  C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44-69 (1994); BEN 
H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY, at xxv-xxvii, 152-73 (6th ed. 2000) (describing 
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vides buyers with easy and often free access to recommendations from 
friends via personal e-mail, listserves, and blogs. Cyberspace is also fos-
tering the growth of entities seeking to offer expert recommendations as 
“selection assistants” (SAs).
215 Previously, personal shopping consultants 
were too expensive for most shoppers. The Internet, however, by eliminat-
ing the need for the consultant to waste time on traveling to clients and 
also expanding their potential customer basis worldwide, thereby enables 
them to amortize their research costs over many more customers. This in 
turn permits SAs to charge lower rates that should be cost effective for 
increasing numbers of consumers eager to save time but still find their best 
choices. Even lower prices should be available for automated offerings. 
SAs can offer more traditional services based on their exhaustive 
knowledge of all the relevant offerings available in a market segment, the 
most relevant features of those offerings, and the consumer’s express pref-
erences for such features.
216 Yet technologies that allow databases of con-
sumer shopping data to be aggregated and manipulated are also increas-
ingly enabling SAs to offer consumers exciting new ”collaborative filter-
ing” services.
217 Collaborative filtering uses data about consumers’ prior 
reactions to creative works in a category to predict their responses to other 
content by searching a large database of consumer purchases and reactions 
for other individuals who had very similar, if not identical, responses to 
those works. The SA can then examine this similar-tastes group to identify 
their reactions to other products, suggesting which to recommend to the 
customer and which to warn them to avoid. Such a system is generally 
much more accurate than any mere set of personal friends or individual 
experts for predicting one’s likely reaction to a particular creative work. 
This taste-driven marketing then may enable lesser known creators to 
                                                                                                                         
 215.  See Mark S. Nadel, The Consumer Product Selection Process in an Internet 
Age: Obstacles to Maximum Effectiveness and Policy Options, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
183, 185-87 (2000), updated version available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=247818. 
The emergence of this class of entities produces a dramatic shift in control over the mar-
ket from producers to consumers. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 174, at 1834; Zimmer-
man, supra note 185, at 1166. 
  216.  SAs could also help consumers to develop a customized, explicit “search pro-
file” comprised of a formula that includes the attributes most relevant to an individual’s 
choice, the relative importance of those attributes, and which values of the latter to seek. 
These profiles should be able to precisely identify the most desirable product for each 
individual in a particular market. See Nadel, supra note 215, at 246-62. 
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come to the attention of their future fans without enormous promotional 
campaigns.
218 
Unfortunately, the euphoria and unsustainable business models associ-
ated with the e-commerce bubble led consumers to expect SA services to 
be free, forcing their providers to seek revenues from advertisers and 
commissions on the goods they helped sell.
219 This made it very difficult 
for SAs to place the interests of buyers ahead of those of the sellers who 
paid them. With excess free capital gone, and thus few, if any, firms will-
ing to provide high value advice free of charge, consumers are beginning 
to be willing to pay for valuable information online. As this willingness 
increases, SAs should be able to blossom.
220 
In addition to fees from buyers, SAs—like financial auditors—might 
charge creators for evaluating creations and offering detailed reviews.
221 
Assuming that these fees were reasonably low, new creators might even 
warmly welcome this alternative to current marketing practices, which are 
expensive and leave many dependent on publishers for financial and logis-
tical support. Meanwhile, as more consumers relied on SAs, unsolicited 
marketing would become less cost-effective.
222 
5.  First Mover or Lead Time Advantage for Hard Copies 
Publishers generally enjoy a “first mover” or lead-time advantage
223 
over copiers in the sale of physical copies. During the period after they 
                                                                                                                         
 218.  See  Utah’s Digital Economy and the Future: Peer-to-Peer and Other Emerging 
Technologies: Field Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) 
(testimony of Peter Breinholt), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/1092000_-
pb.htm. 
 219.  Nadel,  supra note 215, at 203. 
  220. See  Volokh, supra note 174, at 1816, 1830; Michael E. Porter, Strategy and the 
Internet, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2001, at 63, 76–77; Matt Richtel, A Shift Registers in 
Willingness to Pay for Internet Content, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at C4; Neil Strauss, 
Online Fans Start to Pay the Piper, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at E1. 
 221.  See Volokh, supra note 174, at 1830. ForeWord Magazine offers publishers the 
opportunity to have their book reviewed online for $295. ForeWord Reviews, at 
http://www.forewordreviews.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2004). 
  222.  For example, how much would digital camera makers spend on advertising if 
they knew that the vast majority of consumers were relying on Consumer Reports to de-
termine their choices? Large marketing expenditures, which raised product costs, and 
thus prices, would hurt a producer’s Consumers Report ratings and thus probably reduce 
sales. 
 223.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995) (“The 
originator of valuable information or other intangible assets normally has an opportunity 
to exploit the advantage of a lead time in the market. This can provide the originator with 
an opportunity to recover the costs of development and in many cases is sufficient to en-
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release a new work and before copiers can make copies available to con-
sumers, publishers can take two important actions. First, publishers can 
take advantage of any significant consumer demand for immediate con-
sumption of a new work while it is a hot topic of conversation.
224 Such 
demand leads consumers to stand in long lines to see the newest movie or 
to buy a hardcover book rather than waiting for a cheaper paperback edi-
tion. It also leads businesses to pay premiums for access to databases that 
offer the quickest, e.g., real time, access to new data or stories. 
Second, a publisher that can accurately forecast demand, efficiently 
reproducing its works, and pricing aggressively, can probably deter copi-
ers by producing the full output necessary to meet anticipated demand and 
publicizing this fact. Once copiers knew that the publishers’ variable cost 
of selling one more copy would include zero production costs, they would 
realize that they could not compete and rational copiers would refrain 
from entering the market. Most would understand that any copies they 
produced would create an excess supply and trigger a price war that would 
be unprofitable to all. 
Historically, the initial publisher often responded with an analogous 
strategy: it demonstrated that if it faced copiers it would issue “fighter” or 
“killer” editions—extremely cheap versions designed to drive prices be-
low the copiers’ costs. Although this behavior was self-defeating in the 
short run, it served to deter future copying of other works.
225 In fact, first 
mover status was once so advantageous in the book industry that even be-
fore the United States granted copyright protection to books published 
abroad, U.S. publishers paid foreign publishers to secure an early, first 
edition.
226 English authors often received more from the sale of their 
books to American publishers than from their British royalties.
227 
                                                                                                                         
courage continued investment.”); MACHLUP REPORT, supra note 20, at 38-39 (describing 
the rationale behind allowing headstart advantages via patents). See generally William T. 
Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: A Survey of Em-
pirical Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1 (1994). 
 224.  See CAVES, supra note 40, at 277-78 (“[O]nly a few creative goods at a time 
bask in the limelight of buzz.”); supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 225.  See Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 17, at 428; Plant, supra note 7, at 173-75. 
Although the antitrust laws limit this kind of behavior, it is quite effective. See Breyer, 
supra note 15, at 300-01 (discussing restrictions); Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 17, at 
427 (discussing effectiveness). Publishers also used a collusive “courtesy principle” to 
avoid competition before it collapsed. See VAIDHAYANATHAN, supra note 12, at 52-53. 
 226.  See Plant, supra note 7, at 172-73.  
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In addition to deterring entry with “full” production, publishers could 
also deter entry by setting prices just below that sufficient to attract copi-
ers (“limit pricing”).
228 Copiers typically will only see entry as attractive if 
they expect the publisher to maintain high prices that generate substantial 
profit margins, giving the copiers an umbrella price to operate under. Al-
though publishers might find it desirable to tolerate some unauthorized 
copying in exchange for a slightly higher price point,
229 publishers could 
also undercut copiers by setting a high initial price for the work and then 
reducing it to little more than cost once the copiers entered the market.  
Many believe that any first mover advantages due to prior technologies 
have been eliminated by newer technologies, but this is not quite so. It is 
certainly true that DVD copies of a blockbuster movie may turn up on the 
street days before it actually opens in the theaters. MP3’s of a new album 
can pop up on peer-to-peer networks weeks before the album’s release 
date. Illegal copies of best-selling books, like those of J.K. Rowling, are 
mass produced in third world countries and sold at roadside vendors for a 
few dollars. Still, a large portion of the consumer market does not have 
effective access to these copies and thus are still inclined by buy from tra-
ditional retailers. Also, some of these pre-release activities would be pro-
hibited under the truncated version of § 106, discussed below. 
6.  Self-help Technologies: DRM and Tip “Boxes” 
While some new technologies make it easier for consumers to make 
unauthorized copies, others make it easier for publishers to protect against 
such copying or to collect payments from willing consumers. Examples of 
the second include both hardware and software digital rights management 
(DRM) technologies, which can limit how many files a subscriber may 
download or how long a copy remains usable.
230 Although these technolo-
                                                                                                                         
 228.  See SCHERER, supra note 20, at 233-36; see also WATT, supra note 6, at 68 (“All 
piracy can be eliminated with a suitable pricing strategy.”). 
 229.  See WATT, supra note 6, at 58 (“It is not so difficult to imagine cases in which 
piracy can be beneficial to the producers of originals.”); Fernando W. Nascimento & 
Wilfried R. Vanhonacker, Optimal Strategic Pricing of Reproducible Consumer Prod-
ucts, 34 MGMT SCI. 921 (1988). Copying that accelerates network effects may produce 
net benefits. Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction 
of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Externalities, 2 J. INDUS. ECON. 155 
(1994). For example, a single fax machine is worthless, but its value increases as more 
individuals use them. See id. 
  230.  Some DRM technologies include data shields, encryption technologies, and wa-
termarks. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 153-76, 282-303; Mark Stefik, Shift-
ing the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Re-
think Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997); Tom Di Nome, You Lis-
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gies are vulnerable to hacking,
231 those that are reasonably robust or re-
spected because of social norms can substantially reduce unauthorized 
copying. Indeed, since DRM depends on “code” to protect content, some 
fear that “[c]ode can, and increasingly will, displace law as the primary 
defense of intellectual property in cyberspace.”
232 In fact, excessive tech-
nological content protection could be even more detrimental to creative 
output than current copyright law. These excesses should be addressed by 
law.
233 
Technology like the Internet also makes it much easier for consumers 
to contribute directly to creators whose work they consume or admire. Art-
ists can set up their own websites to accept payments or direct their audi-
ences to clearinghouse websites that will forward payment to the artists.
234 
Debit cards and new micro-payment technologies should make even small 
                                                                                                                         
ten, You Pay: Post-Napster Music Services,  N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at G9; Amy 
Harmon, Studios Using Digital Armor to Fight Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 1, at 
1; Eric A. Taub, DVDs Meant for Buying but Not for Keeping, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2003, at C1 (describing expiring discs). 
 231.  See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Students Learning to Evade Moves to Protect Media 
Files, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at C3; Mann, supra note 12, at 44-48. Mann quoted 
Internet security consultant Bruce Schneier, author of SECRETS AND LIES (2000): 
“You always have two kinds of attackers, Joe Average and Jane 
Hacker. Many systems in the real world only have to be secure against 
Joe Average.” Door locks are an example: they’re vulnerable to expert 
thieves, but the chance that any one door will encounter an expert thief 
is small. “But if I am Jane Hacker, the best online,” Schneier says, “I 
can write a program that does what I do and put it up on the Web—
click here to defeat the system. Suddenly Joe Average is just as good as 
Jane Hacker.” 
Id.; see also Pool, supra note 197, at 221 (“At any given moment, the race of technology 
may seem to shift in favor of hiders over seekers, but there is little reason to expect hiders 
to win a decisive advantage in the long term.”); Matt Richtel, Digital Lock? Try a Hair-
pin, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, § 4, at 12. 
 232.  See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 173, at 126; Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the 
Digital Jungle, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 110-11 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 
2001).  
 233.  See CED REPORT, supra note 80, at 38-39, 74-77; Julie E. Cohen, A Right to 
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at ‘Copyright Management’ in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. 
L. REV. 981, 999-1000 (1996)). 
  234. Examples of clearinghouse websites include Fairtunes and Tipster, or even 
Amazon’s tip jar. What We Do,  at http://web.archive.org/web/*/www.fairtunes.com/-
about/description.jsp (last visited May 1, 2004); What is Tipster, The Tipster Protocol, at 
http://tipster.weblogs.com/tipster (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); Amazon Honor System, 
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online payments more economical.
235 This could make it practical for re-
spected pundits to offer access to their columns or new musicians to indi-
vidual songs for, maybe, 25 cents each. It would also provide the techno-
logical backbone for the tip-oriented business model discussed in greater 
detail in Part IV.B. 
7.  Ancillary Hardware Sales 
In the early days of radio, before the business model of advertiser-
supported content was introduced, content was broadcast free by firms 
seeking to profit from the sale of radio receivers.
236 Expanding on this 
model, hardware manufacturer industry groups might find it cost-effective 
to increase customer demand for their products by vertically integrating 
into or financing creative content for use in their product.
237 Currently, the 
owners of Broadway theaters often invest in very risky new shows to give 
value to what might otherwise be empty seats in their theaters. Even when 
theater owners lose money producing the play, they may make enough 
from renting their theaters to more than compensate for this. Of course, 
theater producers generally only do so for productions in their own thea-
ters, making this example less relevant for other industries. Still, to the 
extent an industry trade association were to use persuasion to encourage 
voluntary, industry-wide contributions to such content, this could be a 
source of financing for some new forms of contents.  
B.  Social Norms: Tipping, Donations, Dues, and Reciprocity 
Publishers can and should do more to tap the enormous potential of 
social norms
238 for providing a funding alternative to the current socially 
harmful broad legal protection of § 106. Instead of trying to handicap new 
                                                                                                                         
 235.  See  Anne  Eisenberg,  A Virtual Cash Register Rings Up Tiny Transactions, N.Y. 
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powerful phenomenon. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); 
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(1997). 838  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
technologies and scare consumers into avoiding the use of others by 
threatening lawsuits, publishers should use their experience and expertise 
in marketing to teach consumers to view reasonable payments to creative 
artists as only fair and the right thing to do.
239 Publishers should encourage 
a stronger social custom of tipping, donating to, or otherwise supporting 
valued content creators and their publishers. 
Individual consumers already support artistic creations in many ways. 
Some people donate cash to street musicians and at “pay what you can” 
live performances and museums. Others contribute money to public 
broadcasters and to creators of shareware computer programs.
240 In fact, 
consumers are often willing to pay more than they must in order to support 
some greater good. Just as many are willing to pay a voluntary “sur-
charge” for products “made in America” by “union labor,” or otherwise to 
support “reasonable” payments to deserving workers,
241 so too they should 
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Starts Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at C1 (“Being treated like a criminal [for 
private copying] makes me want to act like one.”); Mark Landler, For Music Industry, 
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be willing to pay, i.e., tip, creative artists, even if there is no legal re-
quirement.  
The model of voluntary payments most relevant to creative artists is 
that of restaurant tipping, which generates approximately $20 billion a 
year.
242 Although many tippers may claim that they tip to reward quality 
service, data show that tip size is only slightly related to the quality of the 
service.
243 Most North Americans tip even when they receive bad service 
and never expect to return to the restaurant.
244 They appear to act primar-
ily to maintain a self-image of being “fair,”
245 treating tips as payments 
due for services rendered.
246  
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vice.”); William Grimes, Tips: Check Your Insecurity at the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
1999, at F1 (“Many uncertainties surround the dining experience, but one thing is sure. 
At the end of the meal, the diner, barring a near-nuclear catastrophe, will leave a tip.”). A 
1996 survey found that 94% of Americans are inclined to leave tips in restaurants. See 
Tibbett L. Speer, The Give and Take of Tipping, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 1997, at 51. 
  245.  Researchers like Michael Lynn have concluded that tippers probably tip to avoid 
disapproval, even by someone they will never interact with again, given existing social 
norm. Conlin et al., supra note 243, at 311-14; Azar, supra note 242, at 2-3; Robert 
Woodhead, Tipping—A Method for Optimizing Compensation for Intellectual Property, 
at http://tipping.selfpromotion.com (last visited May 15, 2004); Fred Hapgood, Voluntary 
Payments, http://tipster.weblogs.com/hapgood (presented to the Digital Commerce Soci-
ety of Boston, Sept. 5, 2000) (last visited May 15, 2004); see also Crespi, supra note 244, 
at 426.  
  246.  Even the Internal Revenue Service considers tips as income. Roberts v. Com-
missioner, 10 T.C. 581 (1948) (finding that it was reasonable for the IRS to treat the tips 
of taxi cab drivers as income, not gifts). Moreover, the IRS presumes that ninety percent 
of restaurant diners tip at least twelve percent. McQuatters v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1122, 1973 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 73,240, 1973 WL 2419. 840  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
Given the American social norm for tipping, publishers should try to 
convince consumers that it is fair to give creative artists their due.
247 Fans 
already pay to join fan clubs of their favorite artists. This approach de-
serves more than the limited attention it has received.
248 A media cam-
paign to encourage consumers of creative content to pay extra because 
creators deserve fair compensation for their work could be modeled after 
the “look for the union label” jingle
  or buy “green” (environmentally 
friendly) advertising.
249  
Now many might view a proposal to rely on voluntary compliance as 
absolutely ridiculous given current widespread public resistance to copy-
right laws. Yet most of that resistance appears to be based on public per-
ception that the current system is unfair: prices of CDs have been too 
high
250 and restrictions on an individual’s own uses, as well sharing are 
excessive, and thus file sharing is not stealing.
251 The recent success of 
                                                                                                                         
 247.  See Pool, supra note 197, at 223 (“People would pay a small extra fee rather 
than feel they are cheating.”); Woodhead, supra note 245; Hapgood, supra note 245. Yet, 
restaurant tipping varies significantly from nation to nation. See Michael Lynn, National 
Personality and Tipping Customs, 28 PERSONALITY  &  INDIVIDUAL  DIFFERENCES 395 
(2000). 
  248.  Among the few who have given this option consideration are Ku, supra note 13, 
at 310-11; Lunney, supra note 63, at 858-68; William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems 
and Possibilities § IV.6, Oct. 2000, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/-
coursepages/tfisher/Music.html (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 249.  See Walter Coddington, It’s No Fad: Environmentalism is Now a Fact of Cor-
porate Life, MKTG. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1990, at 7 (finding that, in 1989, 76 percent of Ameri-
cans stated that they were willing to pay 5-10 percent more for ecologically compatible 
products); Michael Laroche et al., Targeting Consumers Who Are Willing to Pay More 
for Environmentally Friendly Products, 18 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 503, 503 (2001) (finding 
environmentally conscious individuals were willing to pay 15-20 percent more for green 
products) (citing Hazel T. Suchard & Michael J. Polonski, A Theory of Environmental 
Buyer Behavior and its Validity: The Environmental Action—Behavior and its Validity: 
The Environmental Action-Behavior Model, in 2 AMA SUMMER EDUCATORS’ CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS 187 (M.C. Gilly et al., eds., 1991)). 
 250.  See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug Off 
Guilt and Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at A1. This is aggravated when the 
consumer realizes that more than 90% of the price of a CD or DVD goes to middlemen 
rather than the artists, and that publishers are not passing on cost savings from using the 
Internet. See sources cited supra notes 42 and 144. Still, lower CD prices are addressing 
this. See Strauss, supra note 220. 
 251.  See Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 250 (stating that eighteen percent think that 
sharing music files is always all right); Lunney, supra note 63, at 907-10; Mary Madden 
& Amanda Lenhart, Music Downloading, File-sharing and Copyright: A Pew Internet 
Project Data Memo, July 2003 (finding that 67% of Internet users who download music 
don’t care whether the music they download is copyrighted), available at 
 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 841 
 
 
more reasonably priced business models, like the 99 cent per song offer-
ings by Apple’s iTunes,
252 although most of such music is available free 
online, suggests that content consumers are willing to pay reasonable 
prices if given the chance. Back to tipping, it is useful to note that “[i]n its 
early history, tipping was . . . branded as un-American and undemocratic 
. . . [but] tipping eventually became more entrenched in American life than 
in any other country.”
253  
In fact, economists have found that tipping behavior is surprisingly 
common. As one pair of scholars reported: “ [O]ur experiments provide 
many examples where groups move toward cooperation rather than 
free-riding over time. Indeed, our results indicate that deterioration in the 
level of contributions is a special case, occurring only when the incentives 
to reach an efficient equilibrium are relatively low.”
254 A donation system 
may even represent an efficient way to finance some creative activities.
255 
It builds on the fact that many, if not most, consumers like to think of 
themselves as fair.
256 This has led some scholars to recognize that volun-
tary payments such as tips and donations from appreciative consumers 
could play a role in financing new creations.
257 As Kenneth Arrow has 
recognized, social norms can in some cases “compensate for market fail-
ures.”
258 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf (last visited May 15, 
2004). 
 252.  See John Markoff, Apple Sells 70 Million Songs in First Year of iTunes Service, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at C10. 
 253.  KERRY SEGRAVE, TIPPING: AN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY OF GRATUITIES, at 
vii (1998). 
  254.  Charles Bram Cadsby & Elizabeth Maynes, Voluntary Provision of Threshold 
Public Goods with Continuous Contributions: Experimental Evidence, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 
53, 68-69 (1999); Daniel Rondeau et al., Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public 
Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 468 (1999) (“Using 
large groups in an induced value framework, we have shown that the provision point 
mechanism with money-back guarantee and proportional rebate of excess contributions 
can closely approximate demand revelation.”).  
 255.  See Roland J. Kushner & Arthur C. Brooks, The One-Man Band by the Quick 
Lunch Stand: Modeling Audience Response to Street Performance, 24 J. CULTURAL 
ECON. 65 (2000) (proposing that street performance can be economically efficient). 
 256.  See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 1-42, 163-84 (1988). Neither 
tipping nor other related behavior appears to be explainable as enlightened self interest. 
See Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 99; 
Lunney, supra note 63, at 858-68. 
 257.  See supra note 248 
 258.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and 
Externalities, in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS 3, 22 (Michael D. Intriligator 
 842  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
States could require schools to teach students that consuming content 
without paying the creators their due is unfair
259 and discourages creators 
from producing more. Since compliance with copyright norms may some-
times depend more on perceptions of morality and legitimacy than the 
law,
260 the key would be to cultivate the attitude of personal responsibility 
for continued creative output described by one music artist: 
I actually believe that our fans, if they can download something 
that we’re doing from Napster, will feel that they’ve sort of let us 
down if they don’t pay for it. . . . [T]he record company is a bit 
like someone who bets ten pounds on a horse . . . . The relation-
ship the fans have with the artists, they’re a bit like that guy who 
looks after the horse and feeds it and trains it . . . . It’s about car-
ing rather than just having a bet.
261 
Creating this attitude in consumers should work for new or economi-
cally “borderline” artists, although sympathy for them would likely erode 
if they gained financial success. Consumers could be asked to contribute 
for free online copies as well as hard copies, and even to give some lesser 
amount for works borrowed from a library or bought used.
262 This would 
                                                                                                                         
ed., 1971). 
 259.  See  INFORMATION  INFRASTRUCTURE  TASK  FORCE,  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY 
AND THE NATIONAL  INFORMATION  INFRASTRUCTURE:  THE  REPORT OF THE WORKING 
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 203-10 (1995); see also Digital Dilemma, 
supra note 11, at 216-17, 304-10; OTA Study, supra note 11, at 120-21 (pertaining to 
industry education initiatives); Ellickson, supra note 238, at 38-42 (regarding the state’s 
capabilities as moral educator); Laura M. Holson, Studios Moving to Block Piracy of 
Films Online, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at A1 (regarding antipiracy ads by the content 
industry).  
  260.  See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychologi-
cal Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L & POL. 219 (1997). 
 261.  See LEWIS, supra note 182, at 148-49 (quoting Steve Hogarth, the lead singer of 
the band Marillion). These conditions and the success of pre-sales would support the de-
velopment of a radical transformation of the music business.  
  262.  A “droit de suite” approach to artistic work grants artists rights to profits from 
resales of their copyrighted works, and California has adopted a five percent royalty 
payment on resales of fine arts. Michael B. Reddy, The Droit De Suite: Why American 
Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 509, 
521 (1995). Publishers are now eager to apply that concept so as to collect commissions 
on the resale of used books. See Brian Garrity et al., CD Pricing, Used Sales Debated: 
Concerns Rise Over High Retail Profile of Used CDs, BILLBOARD, June 8, 2002, at 1; 
Frank Green, Music Industry Remains in Spin, SignOnSanDiago.com,  available at 
http://www.sduniontribune.com/news/business/20020614-9999_1614usedCDs.html. 
Used book sales have grown dramatically. See Rayner, supra note 55. 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 843 
 
 
be even more practical if the government mandated that distributors of 
content offer consumers an option to contribute to the creator.
263 
Admittedly, tipping an artist may be less compelling given a lack of 
direct live contact comparable to that to food servers in a restaurant, but 
websites could be used to create some meaningful interaction between the 
consumer and the artist. For example, the website could include the voice 
of the creator or enthusiastic fan asking the consumer to please “enable us 
to continue our efforts by contributing at least $1?”
264 Shoppers in stores 
might eschew lower priced “unauthorized” copies in favor of higher-
priced authorized copies merely to avoid the disapproval of the cashier.
265 
Creators might also adapt the model that fan clubs use for soliciting and 
rewarding dues-payers with early notifications about new releases and per-
formance schedules as well other privileges.
266 Theater companies, talent, 
and critics could support playwrights by protesting productions that re-
fused to offer reasonable license fees to artists.
267  
Consumers also already provide substantial financial support to crea-
tors due to their appreciation of the creator’s work or so that they may as-
sociate with such creators. “Angels” often invest in Broadway shows for 
the glamour,
268 and many fans buy merchandise with a creation’s trade-
mark or endorsed by the creator.
269 
                                                                                                                         
 263.  See Ku, supra note 13, at 311 n.319.  
 264.  See Neil McManus, Attention, Shoppers. Don’t You Use That Tone With Me, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at G3 (discussing the use of avatars that look like cartoons, but 
can converse with customers from kiosks in stores); Woodhead, supra note 245 (“It’s 
easy to rationalize stiffing MegaCorp, but much harder to screw the hard-working guy the 
top of whose head they can see on the webcam answering their emails.”). To be most 
effective, payment solicitations would need to be as personalized as possible to counter 
the distance and anonymity of cyberspace. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11, at 49; 
see also Woodhead, supra note 245 (“By letting users set the price, rather than setting it 
myself, I more than doubled my income.”). 
  265.  In a scene from Woody Allen’s BANANAS (United Artists 1971), Fielding Mel-
lish pays a significant surcharge (for a bundle of unwanted magazines) to avoid embar-
rassing attention from a newsstand cashier regarding his purchase of the adult magazine 
“Orgasm,” although his ploy fails. See also Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 17, at 428-29 
(discussing the promotion of a version of J.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy labeled 
as the only “authorized” one in competition with one that paid no royalties to Tolkien). 
 266.  See Strahilevitz, supra note 201, at 567-68 & n.204. 
 267.  Although  Fashion Originator’s Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 
upheld the FTC’s prosecution of the Fashion Guild for organizing a boycott of retailers 
who sold pirated fashions, that boycott was a formal arrangement involving contracts, 
records, and heavy fines. See 312 U.S. 457, 462-65 (1941). A much more informal boy-
cott of institutions that neglected playwrights would appear to be legal. 
 268.  See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory 
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Consumers are also likely to be more inclined to pay creators for ancil-
lary services when they feel indebted to the creators for previous enjoy-
ment of uncompensated work. This is not to claim that consumers will not 
seek out the most highly qualified service providers when they need a ser-
vice, but when they view many as virtually equal, they are apt to choose 
the one to which they feel indebted. Thus, creators could earn funds by 
offering consumers the selection assistance discussed above in Part 
IV.A.4. Those with expertise in a field of business, such as human re-
sources or sales, might be offered an inside track for serving as members 
of corporate boards of directors, representing shareholder interests.
270 
The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 imposed surcharges on digi-
tal audio recording devices and associated storage media to compensate 
copyright holders for the unauthorized copies they feared would ensue.
271 
Although weak demand reduced the significance of that experiment, this 
approach has significant academic support,
272 and in Western Europe, 
broadcast content has long received substantial funding from periodic li-
cense fees on radio and television sets and advertising.
273 This approach, 
however, failed to get much traction in Congress when it was presented as 
a response to the Sony Betamax decision,
274 probably due to some key 
                                                                                                                         
of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990); Kelsey & Schneier, supra note 185, at 
8; cf. Chris Nelson, Rock Group Finds a New Way to Sell Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2002, at C9 (quoting one fan “It’s a way for me and the other people . . . to really feel like 
[we’re] part of the band, part of their music.”). New online art forms even enable creators 
to sell rights to “participate” in a creation. See Mirapaul, supra note 196 (discussing sales 
of “shares” in an online work). 
 269.  See, e.g., VOGEL, supra note 41, at 96; Eric Asimov, Britney Spears; Not Yet a 
Woman, Already a Restaurateur, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at F1; Laura M. Holson & 
Rick Lyman, In Warner Brothers’ Strategy, A Movie is Now a Product Line, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2002, at C1; Leslie Kaufman, PBS is Expanding its Brand from the Television 
Screen to the Shopping Mall, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at C10. 
  270.  In fact, such independent experts could alleviate the problems created by current 
board members more accountable to management than shareholders. See Mark S. Nadel, 
More Power to Shareholders, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1989, at A8. 
  271.  The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237, 
applied it to digital audio recording devices and associated storage media. 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1003-1007 (2000). 
 272.  See Lunney, supra note 63, at 853-55; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose 
a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (2003) (proposing such a levy on digital hardware to compensate for free per-
sonal use copying of digital content); Strahilevitz, supra note 201, at 587-90. 
 273.  See ELI M. NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 3 (1991). 
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drawbacks to such surcharges.
275 Instead of mandating this surcharge, 
consideration might be given to making a strong effort to encourage hard-
ware purchasers to make a suggested contribution at the time they pur-
chased hardware capable of making unauthorized copies.  
Certainly, there would be many free riders, but a social norm for tip-
ping creative artists coupled with a de-escalation in today’s hyper-
marketing practices could enable many new artists to finance both produc-
tion and promotion. In fact with digital media, the virtual elimination of 
reproduction and distribution costs would allow some artists to handle 
their own marketing and production.  
C.  Government Funding 
Governments have long provided significant funding towards the crea-
tion of culturally or scientifically valuable (and often unpopular) content 
termed “merit goods.”
276 In fact, most of the greatest artistic and literary 
works of humanity were financed by royal, feudal, or church patronage, 
rather than copyrights.
277 Today the National Endowment for the Arts, the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting,
278 and state and local legislatures and arts groups provide 
significant amount of funds to creators.
279 Moreover, the tax-deductibility 
                                                                                                                         
 275.  Lunney,  supra note 63, at 855-58, 912-14 (discussing three drawbacks: unfair-
ness to those who do not use the resources for copying, discouraging the introduction of 
innovative copying technologies, and transforming copyright from a “property” to a “li-
ability” right). While one can describe copyright as “a tax on readers for the purpose of 
giving a bounty to workers,” see Macaulay, supra note 1, at 737 (para. 9), a tax on pur-
chasers of equipment rather than just consumers of works arguably distorts demand even 
more. See also WATT, supra note 6, at 132-34 (criticizing this approach and noting that 
Australia declared such a mechanism to be anti-constitutional); supra note 20. 
 276.  See Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in RATIONALITY, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 207-10 (Geoffrey Brennan & Cliff Walsh eds., 1990) (discussing the 
concept of “merit goods”). 
  277.  This would include all pre-1709 creative content. See POSNER, supra note 133, 
at 389; Plant, supra note 7, at 170. 
  278.  Prior to 1930, there was very little federal support for content creation. During 
the Great Depression, however, the Roosevelt administration instituted the immense 
WPA Arts Project. See D ICK  NETZER,  THE  SUBSIDIZED  MUSE:  PUBLIC  SUPPORT FOR 
ARTS IN THE UNITED STATES 53-59 (1978). In 1965, the creation of the National Founda-
tion on Arts & Humanities established the National Endowment for the Humanities 
(NEH), the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), and the Federal Council on Arts 
and Humanities. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting was added in 1967. Id. at 59-
79. 
 279.  Id. at 128-30; National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, Press Release, State 
Arts Agency Funding Reflects Continuing State Budget Woes, Nov. 3, 2003, 
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of many arts donations provides a further public subsidy to private dona-
tions.
280 Some have even proposed raising funds for the arts by selling or 
leasing portions of a quintessential public good—the radio spectrum.
281 
Public museums, schools, and libraries also help finance creative work 
with substantial purchases. For example, the Queens Borough Public Li-
brary in New York sometimes orders thousands of copies of a single 
blockbuster,
282 and schools and libraries often pay higher prices for peri-
odical subscriptions to reflect their greater use.
283 It appears that public 
libraries and government-supported academic libraries together now spend 
on the order of $3 billion annually on information resources.
284 The “pub-
lic lending rights” programs adopted in many European nations now pay 
creators based on the uses made of their work in libraries, a model that 
could serve as a basis for a more sophisticated content compensation pro-
gram in the United States.
285 There has also long been support for using 
taxpayer-financed rewards instead of granting copyright or patent rights, 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.nasaa-arts.org/nasaanews/legapprop04/press_rel.pdf (last visited May 15, 
2004). Funds may be allocated not only for their long term value to cultural history, but 
for shorter term benefits to tourism, or community spirit or unity. See THROSBY, supra 
note 113, at 128-30 (discussing tourism benefits). 
 280.  See NETZER, supra note 278, at 43-45. In the spirit of such public-private “joint 
ventures,” some foundations seek to work with the private sector to fund joint projects. 
Examples of this model include the Noggin children’s television show, and online educa-
tional fathom.com. See DAVID BOLLIER, IN SEARCH OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NEW 
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 12-15 (2002); NETZER, supra note 278, at 188. 
  281. See  LAWRENCE GROSSMAN & NEWTON MINOW, A DIGITAL GIFT TO THE NATION 
(2001); see also BOLLIER, supra note 280 (discussing related proposals discussed at an 
Aspen Institute seminar in summer 2001). 
 282.  See Marcia Biederman, Making It Work: Library Thrives With a Common Touch, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1999, § 14, at 3. 
 283.  See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, On the Optimal Provision of Jour-
nals Qua Sometimes Shared Goods, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 324 (1978); see also David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Publishers and Libraries Square Off Over Free Online Access to Books, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at C7 (discussing the same issue with respect to e-books). 
 284.  See CED REPORT, supra note 80, at 14 n. t. 
 285.  See Joshua H. Foley, Comment, Enter the Library: Creating a Digital Lending 
Right, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 369, 385 n.115 (2002); Jennifer M. Schneck, Note, Closing 
the Book on the Public Lending Right, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 883 (1988); see also Ben-
nett M. Lincoff, A Plan for the Future of Music Performance Rights Organizations in the 
Digital Age, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POL-
ICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 172-74 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). 
Breyer rejected the idea of a fund to compensate publishers for photocopying due to the 
administrative costs of collecting funds from libraries. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 322. 
Yet federal funding for such a program might be considered if the other business models 
above did not prove viable in some submarkets.  2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 847 
 
 
although most analysis of this option has focused on patents rather than 
copyrights.
286 
Government bodies also play a number of other roles supportive of 
creators. Public schools teach English, music, and art and support school 
newspapers, yearbooks, and performances, which develops audiences as 
well as creators. Public entities also subsidize facilities such as the Ken-
nedy Center,
287 public broadcasting stations, and cable television public 
access channels.
288 
V.  PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK: DISCLOSURES OF 
PATERNITY AND A SEVERELY TRUNCATED 
PROHIBITION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED COPYING 
(§ 106) 
The business models and social norms discussed above appear capable 
of providing sufficient revenue streams for creative artists and publishers 
in the absence of a prohibition against unauthorized copying, but some of 
those business models depend on two provisions that would replace that 
prohibition. Furthermore, the analysis below suggests that replacing the 
current prohibition against unauthorized copying (§ 106) with a severely 
truncated set of prohibitions might be desirable for producing a more op-
timal level of creative output. 
                                                                                                                         
 286.  See Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 526-27 (2001) (noting that many European countries 
considered such government support schemes in the 19th century); see also Boyle supra 
note 6, at 57. For a detailed review of the major proposals and his own, see Michael 
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Steve P. Calan-
drillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights: Justifications and Problems 
of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Gov-
ernment-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998). 
Ku proposes this for music today. Ku, supra note 13, at 313-15. For support in the con-
text of copyright, see Plant, supra note 7, at 193; Michael Polanyi, Patent Reform, 11 
REV. ECON. STUD. 61, 65 (1944). Despite First Amendment dangers, the government, 
e.g., Library of Congress, already evaluates the quality of popular culture in other con-
texts. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, So Many Films, But Only a Few are Treasures; Library 
of Congress Separates Mere Movies From Landmarks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at E1. 
 287.  See NETZER, supra note 278, at 46. 
 288.  See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (2000); Felix Gillette, No Static at All, WASH. CITY PAPER, 
Dec. 7, 2001, at 24, 35-36, at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/archives/cover/2001-
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A.  Disclosures of Paternity and Social Norms 
The two new provisions proposed as replacements for broad prohibi-
tions against copying would recognize an expanded right of paternity
289 in 
a manner designed to foster the use of social norms to control unreason-
able, but not reasonable, copying. First, copyright law should expressly 
require copiers to prominently label their copies as “unauthorized cop-
ies.”
290 Existing tort and unfair competition laws already prohibit fraudu-
lent claims of authorship,
291 and significant omissions are condemned as 
plagiarism,
292 but this provision would be more explicit and go a bit fur-
ther. It would help ensure that those consumers who recognized the fair-
ness of rewarding creators would be able to do so and those tempted to 
neglect creators would at least risk embarrassment in front of cashiers (for 
real space purchases),
293 if not guilt. Second, copyright law should require 
copiers to give consumers information about how to tip or donate to the 
creator, making it easier for fair-minded consumers to do so.
294 Even non-
commercial disseminators could be required to include information about 
how to donate to the creators, such as a creator’s URL. 
Those now using filesharing on the Internet would face a different 
choice than they have today. No longer forced to pay $18 for a CD, they 
would now have to choose between paying ninety-nine cents for a song, 
pursuing a somewhat constrained form of filesharing, or violating the law. 
                                                                                                                         
  289.  The right to paternity is guaranteed by the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 6 bis., 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 
3. See also Green, supra note 133, at 206. Many creators, like those discussed in text ac-
companying notes 114-117, supra, care more about being acknowledged for their crea-
tive work than being paid. See Lange & Anderson, supra note 81, at 155. 
  290. See  Tushnet, supra note 89, at 29 & n.102 (2000). The Supreme Court’s unani-
mous decision in Illinois v. Telemarketing Assoc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003), made it clear that 
states can act reasonably to ensure that consumers are not misled about where their pay-
ments go. Copiers would be free to indicate any voluntary payments they made to crea-
tors, but labels could still be required for unauthorized copies to prevent copiers from 
misleading buyers by paying creators only a very small portion of profits. Cf. David Bar-
stow & Diana B. Henriques, 9/11 Tie-Ins Blur Lines of Charity and Profit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2002, at A1. 
  291.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); see also Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 
15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
157 (1989) (“[U]nfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its gen-
eral concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.”). 
 292.  See Green, supra note 133; Richard A. Posner, On Plagiarism, ATLANTIC, April, 
2002, at 23. 
 293.  See supra note 265. 
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The new, legal, but constrained form of filesharing would require them to 
seek out a provider who included a prominent label that 1) disclosed that 
the copies it provided were unauthorized and 2) gave recipients a URL 
where they could make voluntary payments to the relevant artists. Mean-
while, authorized publishers would be able to promote the fact that buying 
their versions would support the creator directly much like the “look for 
the union label” campaigns mentioned above. Government entities could 
also require, or at least encourage, public entities like schools and libraries 
to buy only authorized copies of content when the copies are priced close 
to the market price.
295 
Most consumers would probably find it easier to pay reasonable fees 
than to pursue the constrained, but legal form of copying. On the other 
hand, those who pursued their former unconstrained form of filesharing 
would stand in a very different light. While they might previously have 
thought of themselves as involved in civil disobedience,
296 flouting copy-
right law to “beat” the big, bad, rich publishers, they would now be violat-
ing a law that merely sought to aid sympathetic creators in a minimally 
burdensome manner. They would be hard pressed to defend their actions 
as more than personal selfishness and cheating. In fact, there is even rea-
son to believe that many of those cyberspace leaders and many hackers 
who now devote significant time and effort to beating the “evil” music in-
dustry, would be willing to serve as vigilante, Guardian Angel-like protec-
tors of new artists, policing cyberspace to try to ensure that such deserving 
creators were not being cheated. 
B.  A Truncated Set of Prohibitions Against Unauthorized Copying 
It appears that even the combination of technology, social norms, and 
the two legal provisions just mentioned would not, in an environment 
lacking current § 106, be able to provide sufficient support to ensure that 
all types of creative content were economically viable at optimal levels. 
Rather, some categories of creative content would seem to deserve some 
appropriate level of protection against unauthorized copying, although 
given the social and economic costs of a broad § 106 to consumers and 
                                                                                                                         
  295.  In 2000, more than 100 public and private universities refused to authorize the 
use of their logos on lower-priced apparel made by companies whose factories did not 
meet the standards of the Fair Labor Association. See Thomas L. Friedman, Knight is 
Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2000, at A25; see also Breyer, supra note 15, at 305. 
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new creators alike, as discussed in Parts II.B and II.C, it would be impor-
tant to keep such protection to a minimum.
297  
This Article offers a general strategy for a minimal level of copyright 
protection against unauthorized copying. Congress could adopt general 
standards, modeled on the four-element test for judging fair use under 
copyright law,298 and leave it to the courts to develop a common law reso-
lution of copyright protections, as courts already do when judging allega-
tions of unfair competition.
299 As Ray Patterson and Jessica Litman have 
suggested, copyright law could prohibit only commercial exploitation, 
rather than all copying.
300 A possible framework for providing publicly 
beneficial protection to creative content might resemble the following: 
1.  General Provisions 
Unauthorized copying might be prohibited where copiers did not offer 
consumers a significant incremental benefit, such as significantly lower 
prices or easier access, over what publishers already offered. Thus, copiers 
would be prohibited from copying content that the original publisher was 
already providing at no charge online. For example, as long as newspaper 
                                                                                                                         
 297.  See KAPLAN, supra note 12, at 115-17; Macaulay, supra note 1, at 734-35 (para. 
7) (stating that copyright “ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose 
of securing the good [of increased production]”); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyber-
space, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133 (1999); William W. Fisher III, Property and Con-
tract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1249 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copy-
right and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 
1615 (2001) (“incentives should be as modest as possible”); Sterk, supra note 27, at 
1205. 
 298.  See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000). For a clear recent application of the standard see 
Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). See generally WIL-
LIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995); Benkler, 
supra note 35; Fisher, supra note 22; Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854-59 (1992). 
But cf. Fisher, supra note 22, at 1717-19 (proposing alternative compensation schemes 
for digital content); Leval, supra note 88 (suggesting that despite inconsistent adjudica-
tion, there are sound principles governing fair use rooted in the purpose of copyright 
law). Ideally, Congress would adopt such criteria only after carefully considering the 
effects of different terms on various types of content, although the disappointing UCITA 
model gives little cause for hope on this. See Samuelson, supra note 139. 
 299.  See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 140, at 139-44; Reichman & Uhlir, 
supra note 140, at 825-28, 836-37.  
 300.  See LITMAN, supra note 7, at 180; LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HIS-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 194, 215, 228 (1968) (observing that federal copyright law was 
originally designed to protect an exclusive right to sell); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 
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stories are available free online, other newspapers should not be allowed 
to make unauthorized republications of them, where they could easily 
have provided a “deep link” instead.
301 The same would be true for books 
like Lawrence Lessig’s “Free Culture,” which is available free online as a 
PDF file.
302 Similarly, to the extent that television program producers or 
record companies provide free access to their materials online, accompa-
nied by commercial messages, others would only be allowed to dissemi-
nate the links to those materials, not the materials themselves. 
In addition, the law could accord publishers protection for “hot news” 
under a misappropriation standard like that adopted by the Supreme Court 
in International News Service v. Associated Press.
303 This protection could 
apply whenever copiers tried to deny a publisher its first mover advantage, 
as by transmitting a publisher’s live feed simultaneously over a competing 
channel or trying to scoop another publisher’s exclusive.
304 Granting a 
publisher 24-hour exclusivity might be deemed a safe harbor for avoiding 
suit for unfair competition. The law might also prohibit unauthorized dis-
semination before the publisher had a “reasonable” chance to release a 
new work to consumers.
305 A provision like this should provide more than 
                                                                                                                         
  301.  Deep links take users directly to specific content on a website, bypassing home 
or other front pages (and ads or other attractions). See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 
Inc., No. CV-99-7654 HLH, 2000 WL 525390, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553 (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 27, 2000), aff’d, No. 00-56574, 2001 WL 51509, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1454 (9th 
Cir. Jan. 22, 2001). This would, however, only prohibit online copying, not the dissemi-
nation of hard copies to those lacking easy online access. This would support the much-
criticized result in Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1862 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 16, 2000).  
 302.  See http://cyberlaw-temp.stanford.edu/freeculture.pdf (last visited May 15, 
2004). 
  303.  Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also L. Ray Patter-
son, Copyright in the New Millennium: Resolving the Conflict Between Property Rights 
and Political Rights, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 729-30 (2001). 
 304.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) 
(holding that excerpting President Ford’s memoir before it was published was not fair 
use). The standards might be limited to situations meeting the 3 conditions articulated in 
2 J. THOMAS  MCCARTHY,  MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR  COMPETITION 
§ 10:51, at 10-95 (4th ed. 1996) (naming three elements of misappropriation: (1) substan-
tial investment in the appropriated item by the plaintiff; (2) appropriation at little or no 
cost by the defendant; and (3) injury to plaintiff by the misappropriation). 
  305.  The release could be via the airwaves, wires, or in hard copies. This could dis-
courage filmmakers from releasing their films for broadcast or home video, but that 
would seem unlikely given the investments studios make in marketing during the original 
release period and how quickly marketing value depreciates and most films age. Still, this 
might not apply to classics, such as many of Disney’s animated features, which are rere-
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adequate protection to those producing real time sporting events, award 
shows, or live reality shows. 
2.  Provisions for Specific Industries 
Granting different statutory copyright protections to different industry 
segments may also better tailor the solution to the problem of providing 
optimal incentives for content creation. While such differential treatment 
may raise some problems,306 the current, relatively uniform standards for 
all varieties of creative content may well produce greater harm. Instead, 
each individual industry segment should be considered on its own mer-
its.307 If industry groups believed that they needed additional legal protec-
tion to function at socially optimal levels, Congress could hold hearings 
and evaluate evidence, as it did when adopting the Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act in 1970.
308 If film studios could demonstrate a need for more pro-
tection in order for very old films to be restored,
309 then such evidence 
would justify aiding such content, but not new protection for book pub-
lishers or recent or future films. Given the likely need for analysis of de-
tailed and continually-changing economic data, an expert body, like the 
Copyright Office, might be assigned the task of conducting administrative 
rulemakings.
310 Certainly, lobbyists for each industry would seek special 
protection, but their efforts would be constrained by their burden of pre-
senting data justifying such special protection. 
Those seeking additional protection could be required to show that: 1) 
they expended significant efforts to produce their creations; 2) sufficient 
                                                                                                                         
leased periodically. See BETTIG, supra note 107, at 97-99. 
 306.  See Breyer, supra note 15, at 322 (courts may have difficulty distinguishing 
between classes). But see KAPLAN, supra note 12, at 117 (proposing different copyright 
terms for various types of works). 
 307.  See Chafee, supra note 38, at 510 (“The scope of protection for each kind of 
property should depend on its nature.”). 
  308.  Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2000)). 
The Act seeks to preserve a diversity of editorial voices by making it easier for newspa-
pers to qualify for the “failing company” defense to an otherwise anti-competitive 
merger. See Committee for an Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 478 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); see also COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 54, 
at 49-51. 
 309.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206-07 (2003) (affirming extension of the 
copyright term in part because it may encourage copyright owners to invest in the restora-
tion of their works). 
  310.  Research and analysis of the data might be provided by the respected, non-
partisan, and experienced National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council. 
See, e.g., DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 11. 2004]  CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW DISCOURAGES CREATIVE OUTPUT 853 
 
 
compensation was unavailable from other sources;
311 and 3) their pro-
posed additional protection was minimally burdensome to creators and 
consumers.
312 For example, producers of non-time-sensitive broadcast 
television programming might assert that 24-hour protection would be in-
sufficient to recover the hard costs of the quality fare offered by HBO. 
Setting the minimum duration of protection would be difficult, but it is 
useful to note that publishers earn large revenues from theaters, pay TV, 
and video rentals even though viewers know that the content will be avail-
able in only a few years on free television. A few months might suffice for 
books and only a few days for the increasing number of one-time-only re-
ality TV shows, although other categories might justify longer terms.
313 
3.  Consequences of Revising § 106 
In considering how media markets would be affected by a drastic re-
duction in § 106 rights, it is useful to distinguish between currently popu-
lar creators and new entrants. The former are likely to remain viable by 
employing the business models discussed above in Part IV. For example, 
movie theater technology should protect the lion’s share of first run box 
office receipts,
314 and established filmmakers could easily cultivate further 
                                                                                                                         
  311.  These first two are similar to the standards that the European Database Protec-
tion Directive requires for non-creative databases, see Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 70-
71, and those of David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson’s standard respecting in-
fringements for transformative works. See Lange & Anderson, supra note 81, at 154. 
  312.  Legislation passed under this provision should be held to the Court’s intermedi-
ate scrutiny standard. See Baker, supra note 7, at 922-33; Netanel, supra note 87, at 47-
69. Under that standard, the government would need to show that “the record as it now 
stands supports Congress’ predictive judgment” that the provision 1) furthers important 
governmental interests; and 2) does not burden substantially more speech than necessary 
to further those interests. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) 
[hereinafter Turner II]. This is the approach the Supreme Court took in Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (“Turner I”) concerning the FCC’s 
“must carry” rules. Turner I recognized that the “mere assertion of dysfunction or failure 
in a speech market, without more, is not sufficient to shield a speech regulation” from 
First Amendment review. 512 U.S. at 640. But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220-21 (rejecting 
the relevance of Turner to copyright). 
  313. See  Bill Carter, Reality Shows Alter the Way TV Does Business, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2003, at A1; Steve Lohr, Steal This Book? A Publisher is Making It Easy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at C4 (describing open source electronic books). The Economist 
recently proposed returning to the 18th-century standard of a single 14-year term, renew-
able once. See Copyrights: A Radical Rethink, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2003, at 15. 
  314.  Movie makers might use technology to enhance the theater experience enough 
to justify higher prices. After all, theater tickets are priced many times as high as movie 
tickets for a comparable two hours or so of multi-media entertainment. 854  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 19:2 
 
 
revenue from product placements. Popular musicians, novelists, and text-
book writers could take advantage of the pre-sale mechanisms discussed 
above, as well as fees for consulting and teaching. Similarly, writers for 
television would probably be able to earn substantial amounts from prod-
uct placements as well as for writing draft speeches or draft advertising 
copy for corporation. Free riding would certainly occur, but enough con-
sumers would likely recognize that creators deserved and required a rea-
sonable fee to continue and would contribute, if social norms and technol-
ogy combined to make it attractive and easy. 
The critical question, however, is how a truncation of § 106 copy pro-
tection would affect new entrants who lacked a loyal audience. Since most 
appear willing to earn little in the short run in return for the chance at 
fame, there may be little or no immediate effect; the dramatically lower 
costs of creation, reproduction, and dissemination of media today have 
combined to produce an explosion in the number of new works of all 
kinds.
315 This is not to deny that many creators can benefit, often signifi-
cantly, from the editorial and artistic aid publishers have traditionally pro-
vided, but what they have generally needed most is the expertise and fi-
nancing to reproduce, distribute, and market their creation. After all, new 
creators generally approach a publisher with a sample of their work, i.e., 
which they have already produced. Given that new technologies have re-
duced dissemination costs, if the SAs discussed in Part IV.A.4 grow in 
significance, new creators should stand a reasonable chance of financing 
all of the costs of production, distribution, and minimal marketing to sup-
plement SAs. 
New entrants with particular appeal to the young might find it difficult 
to rely on voluntary dues or donations, since social norms might have less 
sway with this demographic, but they might monetize their special appeal 
through fan clubs. Alternatively, publishers, like current record compa-
nies, might be willing to advance creators limited funds, as well as provide 
services for a fee, in return for a share of revenues that successful creators 
earned over a set term. Although these contracts might well resemble the 
ones currently criticized as exploitive by many recording artists, the re-
formed context may well increase the appeal of such arrangements enough 
to motivate content creation above current levels. 
                                                                                                                         
  315.  For example, the number of new book titles more than doubled from 1990 to 
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C.  Compulsory Licenses 
Even under the system of minimal prohibitions against unauthorized 
copying proposed here, compulsory licenses—granting legal authorization 
to make copies after payment of a statutory license fee—would remain 
relevant. They would provide a mechanism for copiers to avoid the poten-
tially disruptive, if not embarrassing, disclosures of their unauthorized 
uses. Still, setting reasonable license fees is inherently political and has 
proved to be a thorny problem under existing compulsory licensing law.
316 
Furthermore, a compulsory license system strips away the right of creators 
to prevent the use of their creation by someone of whom they disap-
prove.
317 Still, compulsory licenses could strike a judicious balance be-
tween the need of creators for compensation and the desire of other crea-
tors and disseminators to use the work.
318 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that current copyright law probably reduces the 
overall number of new creations while restricting consumer access and 
producing other harms. No empirical analyses have shown that copyright 
protection increases net output.
319 The analysis above reveals that the long 
accepted but rarely examined public value of § 106 of the copyright law is 
highly questionable. Section 106’s impact on generally overlooked en-
dogenous marketing costs appears to lead to a decrease in the economic 
viability of borderline works, diminishing net new creations and thereby 
undermining the presumption that it serves the public interest in this man-
ner. Meanwhile, Congress has neglected to seriously consider the less bur-
                                                                                                                         
 316.  See BETTIG, supra note 107, at 125-50; Dale N. Hatfield & Robert Alan Garrett, 
A Reexamination of the Cable Television Compulsory Licensing Rates: The Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal and the Marketplace, 5 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 681 (1983); Les-
sig & Valenti, supra note 85, at 32-33 (reporting the negotiations involved in setting the 
compulsory license rate for the 1976 Copyright Act); see also Summary of the Determi-
nation of the Librarian of Congress on Rates and Terms for Webcasting and Ephemeral 
Recordings, U.S. Copyright Office (Feb. 23, 2003), at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/-
webcasting_rates_final.html (last visited May 15, 2004). 
 317.  See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 140, at 145-51. 
  318.  Courts could enforce such a requirement in the same manner they handle emi-
nent domain and the essential facilities doctrine requirements. See Sergio Baches Opi, 
The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing In 
the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacro-
sanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409 (2001); Glen Robinson, On 
Refusing to Deal With Rivals, 87 CORNELL L REV. 1177, 1209-11 (2002). 
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densome alternative business models discussed in Part IV for stimulating 
creative output by employing recent technologies in combination with so-
cial norms and a seriously truncated § 106. 
If Congress abridged § 106 there would be some initial negative ef-
fects,
320 especially to publishers and the wealthiest creators.
321 Once crea-
tors recognized that the world had changed, they would likely adjust their 
expectations, just as actors who demand $10 million fees for films pro-
jected to earn $100 million in revenues accept much smaller fees for crea-
tions expected to generate much lower revenues. As long as creators and 
publishers can earn more than their opportunity cost, they will continue to 
produce new works. Meanwhile reducing constraints on dissemination of 
content would be likely to increase societal welfare by spawning a vibrant 
content marketplace that supports the creative endeavor not by prohibi-
tions, but by personal participation on the part of artists and creators alike. 
This paradigm seems better suited “To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts” than § 106—or at the least, well suited to open a more 
productive debate. 
                                                                                                                         
  320.  Undermining author and publisher expectations built on the present system 
would be, admittedly, demoralizing. See Breyer, supra note 15, at 322. Still, that hardly 
seems to justify § 106 in the face of its substantial costs to society. 
  321.  The beneficiaries of the current broad § 106 appear to be the most popular crea-
tors, their publishers and lobbyists, as well as the members of Congress who stand to be 
rewarded with campaign contributions in appreciation for their past and future action. See 
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Corrections made to this draft after “official” publication: 
 
1. 790: n.14: “71-84” was moved from line 3 to line 7 
2. 792: lines 5 & 6 of text: replaced “any case” with “short” and visa versa  
3. 811: n.109: moved quotation marks to follow “light.” 
4. 832: n.217: moved note up 8 lines of text. 